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I. Introduction
On December 17, 1992, U.S. President Bush, Mexican
President Salinas and Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney signed
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and, as
expected, NAFTA was ratified by the three nations and went into
force in January, 1994.2 This agreement creates an enormous free
trade area, with 360 million people and a total trade output of
almost 6.5 trillion dollars in annual production? NAFTA is
I North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Pub. L.
No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2 Id. art. 2203.
3. U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., A GUIDE TO THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: IMPLICATION FOR U.S. BUSINESS xi (1992); see also NAFTA Opens New
Market for U.S. Accountants; North American Free Trade Agreement: Column, ACCT.
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expected to provide considerable free trade benefits for North
American countries, particularly for Mexico, through trade
creation and the resulting effect on consumer welfare. However,
non-participating countries in Asia are likely to suffer economic
hardships because of NAFTA's potential to divert trade away from
Asian countries.
NAFTA's impact on Asia is particularly significant. From an
economic perspective, Mexican goods will likely replace some
labor-intensive Asian goods bound for the U. S. market due to the
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, and relatively
inexpensive and abundant Mexican labor. In addition, NAFTA
will also pose a strong threat to industries in the Asian Newly
Industrialized countries (NICs) because many of them rely on the
North American market as their major export destination. Many
Asian NIC-made products will face strong competition from
Mexican-made products in the U.S. market, 4 and the competition
is expected to be fierce as soon as Mexico acquires enough foreign
capital and advance technologies. Therefore, the impact of
NAFTA seems by extension important to the overall Asian
economy. Facing imminent adverse impact from NAFTA, Asian
enterprises need to study investment feasibility in Mexico in order
to maintain their competitiveness and secure access to the NAFTA
market.
On the other hand, Mexico is undergoing a fundamental
transformation in its economic strategy and its relations with the
international community in order to revive itself from the debt
TODAY, Oct. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
4 Anna Taing, Malaysia: East Asia Faces Big NAFTA Challenge-Lehmans, Bus.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtfe File. According to a
report unveiled by Lehman Brothers, facing the impact of NAFTA, Asian "new" NICs,
Malaysia, China, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, may be more vulnerable in
the long run, because of their growing dependence on the North American market. Id.
On the other hand, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan will experience
greater trade diversion in the short term. Id. In addition, a study made by U.S.
DRIiMcGraw-Hill consulting firm also forecasted that competition from Mexico would
cut Taiwan's exports to the U.S. by US$ 4.4 billion between 1994 and 2000 as a result
of NAFTA. See DRIiMCGRAW-HILL, THE IMPACT OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT ON INDUSTRIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN 2 (1993). Moreover,
Korean studies also suggest that their exports, such as computers, textiles, automotive
products, and consumer electrical equipment, in the U.S. market will face strong
competition from Mexican made ones. Lee Hang-koo, South Korea: The Impact of
North America Free Trade Agreement on Korean Industries, KOREA ECON. DAILY, Apr.
1, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtfe File.
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crisis of the 1980s.' One important task in Mexico's economic
reforms is to encourage foreign investors to participate in its
economic revitalization.' Because a deregulated and liberalized
legal framework can pave the way for foreign investors to
participate in Mexico's economy, the Mexican government made a
structural improvement in its foreign investment regime.
Mexico's efforts in its reforms combined with the establishment of
NAFTA indeed create a favorable climate for attracting foreign
investments.
The purpose of this article is to examine the feasibility with
which Asian enterprises might strengthen their competitiveness in
the NAFTA market by investing in Mexico. To serve this
purpose, part II will give Asian investors a brief picture of
Mexico's structural reforms in its economy as well as the potential
pitfalls causing investment difficulties in this country. Part III will
layout the improvement of legal framework in Mexico's foreign
investment regime. The functions and benefits of Mexico in the
NAFTA and potential Western Hemisphere market will be
described in part IV. Recommendations and strategies in the
potential sectors for Asian enterprise to access the NAFTA market
through Mexico will be explored in part V. Finally, this paper
concludes that Asian investors should view Mexico not only as
their North America production base but also as a regional hub of
the Western Hemisphere.
5 U.S.I.T.C., The Likely Impact on The United States of A Free Trade Agreement
with Mexico, 1-1 (1991) [hereinafter U.S.I.T.C. Likely Impact]. The traditional
perception of Mexico is that of a protective and closed economy, which is reinforced by
its self-sufficiency and substantial government economic intervention policies. Id. Like
many Latin American countries, Mexico adopted import-substitution policies,
restrictions on foreign investment, and control of exchange rates to sustain its domestic
economic growth and to avoid foreign domination of its economy. Id. Mexico relied
heavily on its abundance of oil resources to obtain numerous foreign loans to finance its
high consumer spending levels and unproductive investments. Id. 'However, the
collapse of oil prices followed by high international interest rates in the early 1980s led
Mexico into an economic crisis. Id. Massive foreign debts and hyperinflation caused a
large amount of capitai outflow that further crushed this country's economy into
irreversible decay. Id.
6 PHILIP RUSSELL, MEXICO UNDER SALINAS 219-20, 223 (1994).
7 See infra notes 126-64 and accompanying text.
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II. Mexico: A Country in the Process of Revival
A. Macroeconomic Adjustments
Mexico has endured the pain and risk of transforming its
political and economic system into a moderate free-market system.
After its economic crisis in the 1980s, 8 the Mexican government
moved to change what had been a highly protected and over-
regulated state controlled economy into one substantially more
open to trade, private foreign and domestic investment.9 Its reform
strategy was to first use governmental intervention to regulate
certain economic disorders. As such reforms gained momentum
and political support, the Mexican government then gradually
increased the role of the market oriented system.
1. Inflation
To foster a favorable investment environment and make the
Mexican economy less vulnerable, it was crucial to reduce
Mexico's inflation. The Mexican government utilized several
inflation control mechanisms, which included the annual
enactment of a price and wage freezing pact,10 the autonomy of the
Mexican central bank,"1 and debt reduction. 2 The outcome of
I See supra note 5.
9 JAN FEDOROWICZ ET AL., Bus. MEX. 9-10, 21-42 (1994).
10 Martin Langfield, Mexico Economic Pact Seen Renewed in October, REUTERS,
Sept. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtcsa File. The economic pact,
known as PECE, is an agreement involving all sectors of the Mexican economy in a
coordinated mechanism to establish limits on prices, wages, taxes, currency and
government spending. Id. However, PECE has also been criticized for its side effects.
Critics frequently cited milk production as an example. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 185.
Between December 1988 and May 1990, the prices for cattle feed grains such as cotton-
seed hull, alfalfa, and sorghum, were allowed to increase by more than 100 percent. Id.
Nevertheless, milk prices were only allowed by the participants to increase by 44
percent. Id. Therefore, many Mexican dairy farms were not willing to devote their
efforts to milk production. Id. As a result, Mexico had to import milk from the U.S. at a
price higher than those of domestic producers in previous years. Id.
I I Roberto Galvan Gonzalez, Bank of Mexico Reorganization, Central Bank Spin-
off, Bus. MEX., June 1994, at 18. On April 1, 1994, the Mexican Legislature amended
Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution to grant autonomy to its central bank, Bank of
Mexico. Id. The independence of Bank of Mexico is designed to avoid Mexico's
previous mistake, which allowed other government *authorities to finance public
spending by petitioning the central bank for unsecured loans. Id. The unsecured loins
unavoidably caused Bank of Mexico to increase the money supply and thereby increased
inflation rates. Id.
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implementing these economic adjustments is impressive, and it
has significantly brought down inflation from a record high of 159
percent in 1987 to 7.1 percent in 1994.'"
2. Trade Liberalization
Mexico has instituted numerous trade reforms in order to
increase its international competitiveness after the failure of the
import substitution policy in the early 1980s. 14  These reforms
produced tremendous initiatives through bilateral and multilateral
agreements. In particular, through its 1986 accession to full
membership in the General Agreement of Trade and Tariff
(GATT), Mexico has clearly proclaimed an intention to conform
its trade laws and policies to world standards.' 5 As part of its
obligations under GATT, Mexico has significantly reformed its
tariff structure to enable the Mexican market to be more
accessible.' 6  In addition, Mexico has also gradually eliminated
many of its non-tariff barriers, such as official prices, import
permits, and quantitative controls. 7 Today, the average import
tariff rate is close to 10 percent with a maximum rate of 20
percent, and less than 2 percent of all imports are subject to
quantitative restrictions. 8  Trade reforms make the Mexican
12 FEDOROWICZ ET AL., supra note 9, at 17-18. The Mexican government
understood that, if the problem of debt was not solved, any attempts to stabilize its
inflation would not succeed in the long run. Id. Therefore, debt reduction has
represented a key priority for the Mexican government in its economic reforms. Id.
Through a successful debt restructure negotiation with its creditors in 1990, the
Mexican government has significantly strengthened its financial leverage to manage its
debt reduction. See Banco DE MEXICO, THE MEXICAN ECONOMY 1994, 275 (1994),
Table 61: Total External Debt. The outcome has been impressive because by 1993,
Mexico's foreign debt was reduced to 36.1% of its GDP, down from 59% in 1988. Id.
13 BANCO DE MEXICO, THE MEXICAN ECONOMY 1995, at 228 (1995).
14 U.S.I.T.C., Likely Impact, supra note 5, at 1-2. The trade reforms were
initiated by President de las Madrid and sought to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers
to trade with Mexico. Id.
15 E. PETERS & K. S. KIM, FROM TRADE LIBERALIZATION TO ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF MEXICO 13 (1993).
16 FEDOROWICZ ET AL., supra note 9, at 23.
17 U.S.I.T.C., Likely Impact, supra note 5, at 1-2.
18 Economic Comparisons of Mexico, Canada, and the United States: Implications
for the NAFTA, MEXI. TRADE & L. REP., Oct. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Mtlr File [hereinafter Economic Comparisons]; see also Country Report-
Mexico, WALDEN COUNTRY PROFILE, Feb. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Courep File.
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market more accessible to foreign imports and improve Mexico's
resource allocation. Hence, these reform efforts have finally come
to fruition. Mexico's economy has gradually recovered and
become the tenth largest in the world. 9 This recovery has also led
it to a partnership in what will be the world's premier economic
alliance, NAFTA.
3. Peso Crisis
Nevertheless, the recent crisis caused by the sharp devaluation
of the Mexican peso has not only astonished foreign investors but
has also revealed some of the economic flaws in Mexico's newly
liberalized economy. A careful analysis of these economic pitfalls
and their causes would be helpful for investors making decisions
about their projects.
On December 20, 1994, the Mexican government announced
that it could no longer support a fixed exchange rate and decided
to devalue the peso.2" The announcement of the devaluation policy
by the Zedillo administration caused investors who received the
information to respond with panic sales of the peso, and thus, to
withdraw nearly $13 billion within a day.2' This enormous amount
of capital outflow immediately drained Mexico's meager
international reserves, and forced the Mexican government to float
the peso on the following day.22 The confidence of investors in the
peso was shattered and this led to a financial crisis in Mexico.
What made the Mexican government so vulnerable in dealing
with the peso crisis can be attributed to the size of its current
account deficits. The economic reforms have made business
investments in Mexico particularly prosperous, thereby increasing
overall Mexican spending.23 The optimism of NAFTA increased
' BANCO DE MEXICO, supra note 13, at 41. The rank is based on its GDP, which is
measured by the purchasing power of its own currency in the domestic market. Id. , In
addition, it is the fifteenth largest economy in the world if its GDP is converted into
dollars at the market rate. Id.
20 Henry Tricks, Mexico: Mexico Devaluate Peso as Chiapas Whips Markets,
REUTERS, Dec. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtcsa File.
21 Anthony DePalma, Salinas Blames Successor for Peso Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 1995, at D1.
22 Id.
23 See Martin Feldstein, The Right Policy for Mexico and the U.S., WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 1, 1995, at A12.
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Mexican investment in plants and equipment. This investment
substantially exceeded the amount that Mexicans themselves
save,24 and thus accelerated Mexico's current account deficit to
$25 billion in 1992 and $23 billion in 1993.25 In 1994, Mexico's
current deficit reached $26.4 billion, which is close to 8 percent of
its GNP, a ratio higher than international standards.26 This deficit
resulted in Mexico spending around $2.2 billion more in goods
and services per month than it was earning from abroad per month
in 1994.27 To finance the investment-savings gap, Mexico
inevitably had to depend on capital inflows from abroad.28  The
cooling of the international financial market in Mexico29 led to a
dependence on costly short-term financial liquid capitals and its
foreign reserves to cover the current account deficit.
3a
The problem of capital inflows became imminent in 1994
when political turmoil in 1994 shook the confidence of investors
and further increased the reluctance of investors to keep their
24 Mexico: Finance Secretary Addresses Deputies on Economic Situation,
Measures, BBC MONITORING SERV.-LATN AM., Jan. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Txtcsa File. The current proportion of Mexican savings in relation to
Mexico's GNP dropped from the historically high level of more than 20 percent to
levels close to 15 percent. Id. This level is relatively lower than other developed
countries and Southeast Asian countries, which achieve savings levels in some cases as
high as 30 percent. Id.
25 President Zedillo Address the Nation: Announces Emergency Measures, BBC
MONITORING SERV.-LATiN AM., Jan. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library Txtcsa
File.
26 Stephen Fidler, That Sinking Feeling: Mexico's Currency Crisis Has Weakened
President Zedillo's Government, Says Stephen Fidler, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1995, at 12.
See also Mexico: Finance Secretary Addresses Deputies, supra note 24.
27 Fidler, That Sinking Feeling, supra note 26, at 12.
28 Id.; see also Tim Golden, Mexico's New Leader Finds Job Full of Painful
Surprises, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1995, at Al.
29 Fidler, That Sinking Feeling, supra note 26. The successive rises in U.S.
interest rates from February, 1994, and sharp increase of the value of the Japanese yen
made Mexico and other emerging markets become less attractive in the international
financial market. Id.
30 See Id.; Tim Golden, supra note 28. The Mexican government issues two short-
term, 28-day, financial instruments to finance its current account deficit. Mexico:
Central Bank Measures to Overcome Financial Uncertainties, BBC MONITORING SERV.:
LATIN AM., Feb. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. These two
instruments are Cetes (Treasury Certificates) and Tesobonos (Treasury Bonds). Id.
Financial liquid capitals is also called current capitals. For further discussion of
financial liquid capitals see R. CHARLES MOYER ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 626-64 (1990).
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funds in Mexico.3  Since then, Mexico's foreign exchange
reserves have been declining dramatically.32 To respond to the
increasing size of the current account deficit and the decreasing
inflow of capital that made Mexico's economy highly vulnerable,
the Mexican government decided to devaluate the peso to adjust to
the current account deficits.3 The theory behind the Zedillo
administration's strategy is that "devaluation will decrease imports
of merchandise and services by making them more expensive. 34
In addition, the depreciation of the peso will make Mexican
products cheaper and more attractive abroad, and thereby increase
Mexico's exports.35 Through the reduction in imports and increase
in exports, Mexico can gradually increase its foreign exchange
reserve and balance its current account. Therefore, Mexican
authorities decided to impose a 15 percent devaluation on the peso,
hoping that an exchange rate of 4.5 pesos to the dollar would be
suitable for its economic situation.
3 6
Nevertheless, it seems that the Mexican government was too
optimistic about its strategy and underestimated the side-effects of
the devaluation. Devaluation can cause temporary inflationary
effects and can also harm prices in the local currency of imported
products.37 In addition, the depreciation of the peso is also risky to
Mexico because it would inspire temporary crises of confidence.38
For example, devaluation of the peso also abolishes Mexico's
long defended exchange rate policy, which only allows for a
31 Another Day, Another Dive, ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 1995, at 5. The political
turmoil in Mexico included the Chiapas insurgency, the assassination of the PRI's
original presidential candidate, Lius Donaldo Colosio, and formal secretary general of
the PRI, Jose Francisco Massieu. Id.
32 Robert L. Bartley, Mexico: Suffering the Conventional Wisdom, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 8, 1995, at A14. According to a report from Bank of Mexico, Mexico's foreign
reserves were at $30 billion before the assassination of former presidential candidate,
Mr. Colosio, in March, 1994. Id. After the assasination the foreign reserve fell to about
$12 billion at the time of President Zedillo's inauguration on December 1, 1994. Id.
33 Id.
34 President Zedillo Address the Nation, supra note 25.
35 Id.
36 DePalma, Salinas Blames Successor for Peso Crisis, supra note 21.
37 President Zedillo Address the Nation, supra note 25.
31 Bartley, supra note 32; see also Jeff Franks, Mexico: Mexico Government
Brings on Crisis of Confidence, REUTERS-CENT. & S. AM., Dec. 22, 1994, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Txtcsa File.
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maximum annual depreciation of 4 percent for the peso.39 The
Mexican government's initial plan did not inspire confidence in
the markets. Investors responded to the devaluation with panic
sales of the peso and immediately drained out Mexico's foreign
exchange reserves. This situation, thus, forced Mexico to give up
its original plan and freely float the peso in the market. Since
then, Mexico's economy has seemed fragile because it has had a
collapsing currency, which usually indicates an inflationary spiral
and an uncontrolled fiscal deficit in the economy. 4 Fortunately,
because of the recent announcement of U.S.-led $52 billion
guarantee loans to Mexico, the peso has gradually recovered .
From an economic perspective, there is a simple way to deal
with this currency crisis. The Mexican government could tighten
its monetary policy and fiscal budget. These economic
adjustments are intended to reduce its supply of pesos and
government expenditures. Restricting the supply of pesos relative
to the supply of dollars would increase the value of the peso, and
thereby reduce the incentive for investors to cash pesos for
dollars.42 The decrease of government spending can also improve
Mexico's current account deficits. Even though reducing the
supply of pesos would also be likely to push up short-term interest
rates, this would only be a side-effect, and long-term rates may
actually benefit.43
The U.S-led international aid is following such a model and
intends to cure Mexico's fundamental economic flaws. The rescue
package offered to the Mexican government has stringent financial
requirements,44 which include provisions that Mexico run a budget
surplus in 1995 and shrink its money supply through charging
39 See Fidler, supra note 26. The original Mexico exchange rate policy only
allowed for a maximum 4 percent annual depreciation of the Mexican peso. Id.
40 Bartley, supra note 32.
41 Anthony DePalma, U.S. Aid Plan Is Hardly A Cure-All, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
1995, at D5. The U.S. led aid includes $20 billion from the United States, $17.8 billion
from the International Monetary Fund, $10 billion from major European nations, $3
billion from commercial banks, and $1 billion from Canada and a group of South
American Countries. Id.
42 Bartley, supra note 32.
43 Id.
I David E. Sanger, Peso Rescue Sets New Limits on Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
1995, at Al.
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interest rates above the soaring rate of inflation.4 Although some
Mexicans have criticized that the restrictions imposed by the
rescue package have undermined Mexico's sovereignty,
46
agreement to the aid is still the right path for Mexico. Without
international loans, Mexico might be forced to impose a
moratorium on debt repayment as it did in the early 1980s, and
thereby to cause a deep recession in its economy.47 Such a
recession could potentially bring about an uncertain political
climate in which the anti-market forces of the left could win the
next presidential election or even use violence to seize power.
The international aid provides an escape from all of these potential
uncertainties. In addition, the agreement imposes only those
restrictions that are needed to stabilize the peso and economy.49 In
fact, the Zedillo administration may have to adopt monetary and
fiscal restrictions beyond the requirements from the agreement,
since there exists no better choice for Mexico." By accepting the
agreement, Mexico can use the rescue fund to strengthen its
financial leverage and retire most of its costly short-term
government bonds, tesobonos, and convert to cheaper long-term
debts." If it makes use of the rescue fund, Mexico might restore
its credibility to investors soon.
On the other hand, it is certain that the path of economic
adjustments will be painful for Mexicans, at least in the near
future. For example, Mexico's economy is expected to have
negative growth this year. In addition, government taxes and
public utilities rates will increase in the near future,52 and interest
45 Id.
46 Many Mexicans accuse President Zedillo of yielding Mexico's sovereignty to
the U.S. because the severe monetary and fiscal restrictions imposed by the loans mean
an unprecedented degree of control over the management of Mexico's economy.
Anthony de Palma, Sense of Dollar Duress: with Deeper Pain Ahead, Many Mexicans
Accuse President of Yielding Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at Al.
17 Feldstein, supra note 23.
48 Id.
'9 Sanger, supra note 44.
10 See DePalma, Sense of Dollar Duress, supra note 46.
S Id. at D6.
52 Mexico: Zedillo Says Economy to Improve in Late 1995, REUTERS-CENT. & S.
AM., Mar. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtcsa File. The Mexican
government has increased its gasoline price by 35 percent and by 20 percent in
1996]
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rates will remain at historically high levels to restrain the
inflationary spiral and stabilize the exchange rate." The high
interest rates will have a strong adverse impact on economic
activities.5 4 Small and mid-sized companies would experience the
strongest impact because the costly financing will force them into
insolvency, and thus, unemployment is going to be severe.55 Even
though the effects of these economic adjustments make Mexico's
prospects for short term economic development dim,56 Mexico is
still far better off than its was 10 years ago, before it began its
economic reforms. In addition, Mexico's economic turmoil will
eventually subside because its strong export performance arising
from the peso's devaluation is likely to pave the way to the revival
of its economy."
The peso crisis has indeed damaged Mexico's investment
climate,58 and the uncertainty of Mexico's economic future is
electricity charges. In addition, value-added tax also has been raised from 10 percent to
15 percent in the first quarter of 1995. Id. Moreover, the Mexican government will
continue to increase the gasoline and electricity prices based on its newly renewed 1995
anti-inflation economic pact. David Luhnow, Mexico: Mexican Stocks, Peso Surge on
Economic Pact, REUTERS, Oct. 31 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtcsa
File.
53 Mexico's central bank has already raised high short-term interest rates from 40
percent to 50 percent in some government debts. Anthony DePalma, Rates Up Sharply
In Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1995, at DI.
54 Geri Smith et al., Mexico: A Rough Road Back, Bus. WK., Nov. 13, 1995, at
104, 106.
55 Id. at 107. There are a million Mexicans who have lost their job since the crisis.
Id. at 105.
56 According to Mexican Finance Secretary Mr. Guillermo Ortiz, Mexico's
economy is expected to decline by 1 percent in GDP in this year due to the currency
crisis. Peter Truell, Big Investor Relations Task: Selling Mexico to Wall St., N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1995, at D7. However, the Economic Intelligent Unit expected that a 3.5%
decline in Mexico's GDP will be recorded in 1995. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
COUNTRY REPORT: MEXICO 4 (3rd quarter, 1995).
57 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: MEXICO 4-5, 20 (3rd Quarter
1995). The devalued Mexican peso has significantly boosted Mexico's exports. Id.
From January to May, 1995, Mexico's exports grew by 32 percent to U.S.S 31.1 billion
over 1994 levels. Id. at 20. Therefore, EIU forecast that Mexico will have a 1% growth
'in 1996 due to its export performance. Id. at 5.
58 See Richard Lacayo, The Plunger: The Peso Heads South, TIME, Jan. 9, 1995, at
44. Several instances point to a deteriorating investment climate. For instance, Mexico
may have lost 12% of its total foreign investment in the beginning of the peso crisis,
which indicates the lack of confidence in Mexico's' investment climate by foreign
investors. Id. In addition, automobile sales have significantly plunged by more than 50
percent since the peso crisis, another negative sign to foreign investment. DePalma,
Sense of Dollar Duress, supra note 46.
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likely to have a strong impact on investors involved in portfolio
investment in the Mexican financial market. However, the sharp
devaluation in the Mexican peso is not likely to be a negative, but
rather a positive influence on those investors involved in direct
investment related to export-oriented production. 9 After the peso
crisis, Mexican companies are eager to establish partnerships more
than ever before and Mexican assets are attractively priced for
.foreigners to establish a presence in Mexico.6' For example, the
price of real estate and labor wages in dollar terms has been
reduced by more than 40 percent than what they were in December
1 994.6 The devaluated Mexican peso converts to cheap
production costs in Mexico and enables Mexican products to
become more competitive in the international market. 62, Thus, if
investors can refrain from precipitous pessimism, they will find
that opportunities still abound in Mexico.
B. Political Reform
In addition to its economic adjustments, Mexico is striving to
change its political system because political reform. is a sine qua
non for quick economic recovery. Market oriented reformists have
a strong political leader in the country. President Zedillo
successfully took the office on December 1, 1994.63 The new
Mexican government has "pledged to deepen the free-market
economic reforms, reconstruct the corrupt judicial system, and
pursue greater democracy. 64 These pledges send a clear message
19 Lacayo, supra note 58, at 47.
60 Prognoses & Pondering, Latest Economic Forecasts by Experts, Bus. MEX.,
Mar. 1995, at 27, 29.
61 Bartley, supra note 32, at A14. The exchange rate of peso once had 45 percent
of devaluation in the market. Id.
62 Lacayo, supra note 58, at 47.
63 Anthony DePalma, Ruling Party's Candidate Wins Presidency in Mexico, But
Opposition Makes Gains., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1994, at Al. On August 21, 1994,
Mexican voters decided to continue the PRI's ruling of Mexico and chose Mr. Ernesto
Zedillo Ponce de Leon as their new President. Id. Mr. Zedillo is a Yale-trained
economist and serves as a career technocrat with no real political experience in Mexico.
Geri Smith, Mexico: Will Economic Reform Survive the Turmoil?, Bus. WK., Aug. 22,
1994, at 41. He was unexpectedly chosen by President Salinas to run for the presidential
campaign to replace the assassinated candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in March, 1994.
DePalma, Ruling Party's Candidate Wins Presidency in Mexico, supra, at A8.
64 Martin Langfield, Mexico: New Mexican President Takes Office Pledging
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to investors that the path for foreigners doing business or investing
would become more clear and accessible because the country
would be run more by laws and regulations rather than by secret
personal relationships.
However, these changes, especially new moves towards
internal democracy within the ruling party, Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI), 6' have caused agitation and resistance
among the so-called "dinosaurs" of the anti-reform old guards in
the PRI.66  This resistance is expected because the reforms will
take away many traditional mechanisms of political control from
PRI. This resistance would also provoke a power battle between
different interest groups in the country, as they simultaneously
resist the reforms and seek to take the advantage of the reforms
under way. In addition, President Zedillo is truly a freshman in
Mexico's political platform. The Mexican people were not
familiar with him until he became the PRI's presidential
candidate.67 President Zedillo's lack of a political background is
seen as a weakness and thus hinders the PRI and civilian support
of his political changes.68
In addition, President Zedillo has proposed that the PRI should
be independent from the government, and distances himself from
the running of the PRI.69 This proposal shows Zedillo's intention
Reform, REUTERS-CENT. & S. AM., Dec. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Txtcsa File; see also Mexico: President Zedillo Gives Constitution Day Speech, Call for
A "New Democracy," BBC MONITORING SERV.: LATIN AM., Feb. 9, 1995, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Txtcsa File.
65 The Institutional Revolutionary Party has controlled the Mexican government
for more than six decades and has had strong influence in Mexican government. ANITA
WlNSOR, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO 4 (1994); see also Mexico
Will Economic Reform Survive the Turmoil?, BUS. WK., Apr. 11, 1994, at 24.
66 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: MEXICO 9 (4th quarter
1994).
67 President Zedillo did not have any experience in elected office before he became
Mexican president. John Bailey, Mexico's Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1994, at A23.
He has never held significant positions in his party, even though he has been a member
since 1971. See IBC, INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY RISK GUIDE-MEXICO, Apr. 1994,
available in LEXIS, World Library, IBCCRG File.
68 The unpopularity of President Zedillo can be seen in a telephone poll conducted
by Time and CNN in February 1995. George J. Church, Mexico's Troubles Are Our
Troubles, TIME, Mar. 6, 1995, at 38-39. The poll shows that as many as 35 percent
Mexican people have an unfavorable impression of President Zedillo. Id.
69 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: MEXICO 9 (4th quarter
1994); see also Tim Golden, Mexican, Taking Office, Pledges to Fight Poverty and
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to reduce PRI's influence on government officials and disassociate
the president from the PRI scandals.7" Nevertheless, such an
intention would put the party at odds with itself and thereby make
party members less loyal to the sitting president and his policies
than in the past.71 This situation will inevitably undermine the
president's ability to control events and prevent political
upheavals. As a result, this development could lead to political
volatility in Mexico, and thus, damage its investment climate.
The resistance to political reforms would provide little hope
for the Zedillo administration to run the country smoothly.
Nevertheless, foreign investors should realize that such political
volatility is likely to exist in a young democratized country. The
set principles and direction for Mexico are not likely to be
changed. As the political climate becomes more clear, Mexico
will be ruled more by laws and institutions, and become more
stable for foreign investments.
C. The Challenges of Cross Cultural Labor Management
Cheap and abundant labor resources are the most often cited
competitive advantage of Mexican manufacturing.72 There are,
however problematic issues behind this advantage, which some
foreign plant managers repeatedly refer to as "people problems"
and which they consider the most troublesome aspect about
investing in Mexico.73 Indeed, cheap Mexican labor is noted often
by foreign investors for its poor work quality and low
productivity.7 4  Particularly, worker's productivity and product
quality represent the critical successful factors in a product's
competitiveness, in addition to a low wage rate.75 Therefore,
overcoming productivity and quality problems in the Mexican
workforce is a critical challenge for investors' success in Mexico.
Corruption., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at Al. All.
70 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: MEXICO 9 (4th quarter
1994).
71 Id.
72 Mary B. Teagarden et al., Mexico's Maquiladora Industry: Where Strategic
Human Resource Management Makes A Difference; Offshore Manufacturing Sites,
ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Winter 1992, at 34, 40.
73 Id. at41.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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Several factors present challenges for labor management in
Mexico.76 First, the shortage of skilled labor and managers is the
major operating problem for investors' Mexican operations. 7
Mexico suffers from a shortage of highly skilled technician and
middle- and upper-level managers. 7' This shortage has contributed
to high turnover among these skilled managers because they are
constantly leaving for better salaries. 79  Although investors can
recruit trained personnel through several recruiting services, they
often have to offer higher salaries and advancement because the
demand for them is great.8 As a result, the cost for employing
middle- and upper-level managers and skilled technicians in
Mexico can be equal or higher than for their counterparts in the
U.S.
81
Second, high employee absenteeism and turnover permeate
foreign plants, particularly the maquiladoras.82  In some
maquiladoras, absenteeism is as high as 20 percent or more daily,
and turnover ranges from 10 percent to 20 percent a month. 3 The
high turnover and absenteeism are reflected in low productivity
and low quality outputs, and they also become the main obstacle
for investors to effectively implement their manufacturing
strategies. 4 These problems are largely "due to the migrating
76 See infra notes 77-101 and accompanying text.
77 WINSOR, supra note 65, at 90; ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Mexico, 10.00
Human Resource--O.01 Overview, INVESTING LICENSING & TRADING, Sept. 1, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World Library Inlitr File.
78 WINSOR, supra note 65, at 90.
79 Id.
80 These recruiting services can be obtained from unions, employment agencies,
and industrial chambers and association, such as American Chamber of Commerce in
Mexico. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Mexico, 10.00 Human Resource-i0.01
Overview, INVESTING LICENSING & TRADING, Sept. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, World
Library Inlitr File.
'81 WINSOR, supra note 65, at 90.
82 For further discussion of Maquiliadoras see infra notes 214-49 and
accompanying text.
83 Mexico's Maquiladora Industry, MEX. TRADE & LAW RPTR., Apr. 1, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Mtlr File.
84 Terry McDermott, Turnover and Absenteeism Rates Remain Obstacles to TQM
in Maquiladora, Bus. MEX., Nov. 1994, at 42. According to a survey from the
American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico, nearly 90 percent of all respondents claim
that turnover is the main obstacle to effectively implementing innovative management
strategies in Mexico. Id. For example, total quality management (TQM) has become a
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population, low skills -of operators, and poor urban facilities,
transportation, housing and services."85  Particularly, a lack of
"concentration on the work discipline, commitment and
responsibility" in the Mexican educational system are the main
86
reasons for high turnover and absenteeism in Mexico.
To counter absenteeism, some investors have provided free
meals, athletic activities, bus transport, or some extra bonuses,
such as $5 a week for perfect attendance and timeliness. 7 These
incentives ,have had some positive influence in reducing
absenteeism, 88 but they also represent the hidden costs behind the
low wage, rate of the Mexican workers. In addition, the high
turnover obliges the investors to continuously recruit and retrain
new workers, and thus, inevitably increases the management's
difficulty and costs. 9
Third, cultural differences and language barriers are also
challenges for investors in their Mexican operations. These
challenges are particularly difficult for those enterprises from
Asia.9° Many investors try hard, but unintentional failure to work
within, or be aware of, Mexican culture often leads to poor
performance in their Mexican operations. 91 For instance, Mexican
men tend to have a strong sense of "machismo," which manifests
itself in certain behaviors, such as reluctance to admit mistakes or
part of competitive strategies in many industries. Id. However, many foreign
companies find high turnover and absenteeism are major obstacles for them to
implement TQM effectively. Id. According to a report from the American Chamber of
Commerce of Mexico, high turnover and absenteeism may also be attributed to cultural
needs that are not addressed by foreign managers. Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Mariah E. deForest, When in Mexico.... Cultural Awareness Is Key to
Productivity in Maquiladora Plants, Bus. MEx., July 1991, available in LEXIS, World
library, Busmex File.
88 McDermott, supra note 84, at 44.
89 Martha H. Peak, Maquiladoras: Where Quality Is a Way of Life, MGMT. REV.,
Mar. 1993, at 19,22. See also deForest, supra note 87.
90 For instance, the lack of diplomatic relation between Taiwan and Mexico has
seriously hampered bilateral interactions for nearly two decades. PM Lien Opens New
Page in Taiwan-Mexico Ties, CENT. NEWS AGENCY, June 7, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wires File.
91 deForest, supra note 87. For instance, another hindrance to U.S.
implementation of TQM in their maquiladora operations in Mexico is the cultural
differences between U.S. Japan, and Mexico. See generally McDermott, supra note 84,
at 42.
1996]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
ignorance, and unwillingness to do what they consider women's
work.92  This machismo attitude of male Mexican workers
sometimes not only affects the production output, but it also
increases the difficulty of labor management.93
Fourth, the Mexican legal framework has a strong influence on
investors' human resource practices in Mexico. Due to the
historical importance of worker organizations in Mexican politics,
the Mexican legal structure has a pro-labor tendency represented
in detailed constitutional and statutory framework.94 Article 123 of
the Mexican Constitution95 in conjunction with the Federal Labor
Law (FLL) regulates all Mexican labor practices. This legal
structure gives legal protections and benefits strongly favorable to
the Mexican workers, and even goes beyond what investors can
expect. Hence, despite the attractive minimum wage in Mexico,
many fringe and labor-law benefits are required by the FLL for the
Mexican workers, and thereby inevitably increase investors'
operation costs.96 For example, the FLL requires employers to pay
5 percent of payroll to the National Housing Fund to provide
preferable financing terms for workers to purchase houses.97 These
92 Teagarden et al., supra note 72, at 39.
93 Id. at 42. A U.S. automotive parts company experienced high quality ratings in
its Mexican operation. Id. However, the general manager of the company was confused
by the low production efficiency and inexplicably high raw-material costs. Id. After
secretly scrutinizing the Mexican production lines, the management found that "the
Mexican supervisors were too proud to confess they did not know how to adjust the
malfunctioning equipment. Id. Therefore, they chose to discard bad pieces. Id.
91 Ann M. Bartow, The Rights of Worker in Mexico, 11 COMP. LAB. L. 182
(1990). The reason why Mexico has a pro-labor tendency legal framework is because
Mexican worker organizations played a significant role in the success of the Mexican
revolution of 1910-17. Id. Therefore, when drafting a new Constitution in 1917, the
authors incorporated extensive constitutional protections for laborers. Id. Even though
the Mexican Constitution has experienced several amendments, further protections in
worker rights have been added. Id.
95 Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 123 [hereinafter
MEXICAN CONSTITUTION] For an English translation of the Mexican Constitution see
DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, Part 1, app. 2 (Andrea Bonime-Blanc & William E. Mooz,
Jr. ed. 1995). Article 123 specifically delegates to the Mexican Legislature, the Congress
of the Union, the power to enact the laws that apply to all Mexican workers, day
laborers, domestic servants, and artisans, and to all labor contracts in a general way. Id.
96 See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
97 The Mexican Federal Labor Law [hereinafter FLL], art. 136, 137. See 2
COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: MEXICO LABOR LAWS, 26 (1995) (English text of
the Mexican Federal Labor Law).
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fringe and labor-law benefits represent significant hidden costs
behind the attractive low wage rate and commonly amount to 70 to
100 percent of the basic payroll.98 In addition, the FLL also
imposes comprehensive requirements in labor management
practices of employers, such as recruitment, promotion, training
and termination, thereby affecting investors' overall management
strategies. 99 As a result, this pro-labor legal framework not only
increases investors' operational costs but also significantly
complicates worker-employer relations in Mexico.
Despite the labor practices that are a challenge to foreign
operations in Mexico, Mexico still provides many favorable
incentives for foreign investors to locate their operations in this
country. Particularly, the peso crisis has cut dollar-term wages by
42 percent.' Furthermore, the lack of skilled personnel and high
turnover problems have significantly improved in 1995. Because
of the 1995 recession, many Mexican and foreign firms have laid
off workforce or frozen hiring, thereby creating a pool of factory
labor, skilled technicians, and even management executives.' To
truly counter challenges in cross-cultural labor issues in Mexico,
however, investors need to flexibly implement their international
human resource management strategies such as localizing
management to Mexicans, proper employee training, and
productivity driven wage changes, and thus truly take advantage of
the competitive low cost and abundant Mexican labor resources.
D. Bureaucratic Red Tape and Insufficient Infrastructure
Aside from the numerous challenges discussed above,
98 Winsor, supra note 65, at 89, 91. In addition to the 5 percent of the National
Housing Fund, there are many other fringe benefits required by the FLL, such as
medical expenses, old age pensions, disability pensions, and worker compensation. Id.
Also, the Mexican workers are entitled to receive a Christmas bonus, which normally
accounts for at least fifteen days' of salary. Id.
99 For instance, article 159 of the FLL requires that promotion be based
exclusively on seniority. See FLL, supra note 97, art. 159. If investors want to change
their appraisal system toward a merit-based one, they need to enter into a complicated
and time-consuming collective bargaining agreement. Id. In addition, investors are also
responsible for all the training programs regarding the changes. Id.
"I ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Mexico, 10.00 Human Resource-0.01
Overview, INVESTING LICENSING & TRADING, Sept. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, World
Library Inlitr File.
'0' Id.
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Mexico's bureaucratic red tape and insufficient. infrastructure
represent other obstacles for foreign investment entry into Mexico.
First, red tape considerably undermined the shaping of a favorable
investment in Mexico.' 2 Many investors applaud "the macro level
changes which have recently taken place in Mexico and the
commitment to service investors shown by the Mexican federal
government."'' 3 However, some investors have been frustrated by
the lack of micro level changes and the local bureaucratic
bottlenecks that still exist.' °4
In one respect, the bureaucratic problems encountered by
investors are not that surprising in Mexico. Bureaucratic
procedures exist everywhere in the world, and Mexico is no
exception to this fact. While most foreign investors expect a
certain amount of red tape in establishing new foreign companies
in Mexico, many were astonished at the extent of costs -in both
time and money- of the process.' 5 It appears that the philosophical
changes occurring at the federal level have yet to filter down to the
state and local level, where much of the traditional bureaucratic
inertia still exists.'0 6 To facilitate dealing with bureaucratic snags,
investors need to spend more time investigating local regulations
and working with local officials.
Second, insufficient infrastructure has also hampered direct
foreign investment in Mexico such as poor transportation,"' a poor
102 Investors Comment on Mexico, Bus. MEX., Jan.-Feb. 1992, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Busmex File.
103 Id.
104 Gray Newman, Laying Down the Law Enforcement Trends in Environmental
Protection, Bus. MEX., Jan.-Feb. 1993. Local bureaucracy is the most daunting obstacle
to foreign investment in Mexico. Id. An experience from a foreign company located in
the state of Queretaro may be the best example. Id. at 77. The company's plant had
been approved by federal officials in its environmental requirements, but local
authorities refused to allow it to operate. Id. Eventually, the company was able to bring
the matter to the attention of federal authorities who overruled the local authorities, but
that tactic could be more difficult if local agencies have primary authority in
environmental matters. Id. In addition, many investors are surprised by Mexican
bureaucracy in many other respects. deForest, supra note 87. For example, to obtain a
post office box involves several months of negotiation with bureaucrats, and materials
urgently needed for production sit on the other side of the border waiting for lost entry
permits. Id.
101 Investors Comment on Mexico, supra note 102.
106 Id.
107 Alejandro Castillo, A Look at Mexico's Infrastructure, The Challenge to Deliver,
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communication system,"' and inefficient electricity" and water
supplies."' Quite often, foreign investors have been confronted
with big operational problems due to the insufficient
infrastructure.' In addition, the inadequate infrastructure also
causes difficulties for investors to utilize Mexico's resources in
their Mexican operations."2  This problem is particularly
significant in the maquiladora industry." Due to the poor
infrastructure, only 2 percent of materials come from Mexico
because maquiladora investors find that it is easier and cheaper to
truck or ship materials across the border than to transport goods
inside Mexico.' 4
Although the Mexican government has made considerable
efforts to remedy these obstacles, including privatization of
transportation and telecommunication sectors,"5 it will take a long
Bus. MEX., July, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Busmex File. Mexico has
no navigable rivers, and thus, the highway and rail systems are the chief methods of
transportation. Id. Currently, Mexico has only 243,000 kilometers of roadways, and
nearly half of the roadways are unpaved dirt roads. Id. Even though the Mexican
government has put 3078 kilometers of highway into service since 1988, maintenance of
the highway network has been insufficient. Id. at 7. Some estimates have found that "60
percent of the highway network was in poor condition." Id. In addition, the railway
system only has limited capacity and is underutilized. Id. Therefore, compared with its
northern partners, transportation in Mexico is untimely, unsafe and costly. Id.
108 Martha H. Peak, Mexican Miracle: How the U.S. Can Profit From NAFTA;
North American Free Trade Agreement, MGMT..REv., Mar. 1993, -at 17. Telephone
service is inadequate throughout the country. Id. Only four to five per 100 households
have hard-wired telephones. Id. In addition, the failure rates of getting through phone
calls are higher than 20 percent. Id.
109 Id. Electrical outages are frequent in Mexico, thus, investors find that their
production lines are frequently disrupted by power surges and brown-outs. Id.
110 William A Reed, & Miguel Montero. Will NAFTA-Mexico Be A Plus or Minus
for You? TEXTILE WORLD, Feb. 1993, at 35. Insufficient water supply also poses
constraint for foreign operations in Mexico, particularly in the textile industry, which
needs sufficient water for dyeing, printing, and finishing process. id.
111 deForest, supra note 87. For instance, businessmen has complained about the
poor infrastructure as well as inefficiency in Veracruz, a major port located on the Gulf
of Mexico. Lawrence Kootnikoff, Port Take-Over Good for Mexican Trade,
Businessmen Say, BC Cycle, June 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtcsa
File.
112 Martha H. Peak, Maquiladoras: Where Quality Is A Way of Life, MGMT. REV.,
Mar. 1993, at 20.
'3 Id.
"4 Id.
"1 James Brooke, Latin America's Privatization Path, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1994,
at 38. Currently Mexico has 3,000 privatized toll roads. Id. In addition, the country
intends to privatize its railroad systems and satellites sector for long distance
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time to solve these kinds of fundamental problems. To confront
the infrastructure problems, investors are advised to have self-
defense devices, such as using cellular systems for better
communication, and installing back-up generators for the frequent
electrical outages. In addition, investors are advised to locate their
operations near major cities or near the Mexican northern border,
which can provide better infrastructure.
Gradual progress in reducing Mexico's bureaucratic red tape
and improving insufficient infrastructure can be expected. A
streamlining of the bureaucratic red tape has already occurred in
the Mexican federal government suggesting that this could also be
achieved in the state and local governments, with the proper
commitment and a combined effort."' In addition, the Mexican
government should more actively encourage foreign investors to
participate in building infrastructure by providing special
incentives.
Although there are investment difficulties in Mexico, investors
thinking of participating in this surging economy are looking at a
market of 86.6 million people."7  In addition, Mexico, the
thirteenth largest country in the world,"8 is a country with a great
diversity of natural resources," 9 replete with young human
resources.' Its strategic geographic location as a bridge between
North and Latin America has placed Mexico at a strong
telecommunication. Martin Langfield, Mexico: Mexico Clear Way for Satellite Rail
Privatization, REUTERS, Jan. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtcsa File.
1 6 Investors Comment on Mexico, supra note 102.
"1 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 56, at 3.
18 See Winsor, supra note 65, at 3. Mexico covers 746,000 square smiles and is
also the third largest country in Latin America after Brazil and Argentina.
119 Banco de Mexico, supra note 13, at 42. Mexico produces a great variety of
crops and is rich in minerals. Id. Currently, Mexico is one of the ten largest producers
of corn, coffee, soybeans, sorghum, beans, tomatoes and ranks tenth in the world in meat
production. Id. In addition, Mexico is ranked the largest silver producer, sixth largest
oil producer, and eighth in terms of proven natural gas and crude oil reserves in the
world. Id.
120 Country: Mexico., ABC-CLIO, Feb. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Profile File. Mexico currently has a work force of 28 million people and is the
second youngest in the world. Id. Moreover, an additional 12 million workers will
enter the force over the next ten years, since nearly 30% of the population is between the
ages of 16 and 30. Winsor, supra note 65, at 88. Furthermore, Mexican workers are
relatively well-educated and Mexico has the lowest illiteracy rate among the Latin
American countries. Teagarden et al., supra note 72, at 41.
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comparative advantage vis-A-vis other countries. 2' Moreover, the
widespread economic, political, and regulatory reforms are likely
to speed the pace of Mexico's economic recovery from the peso
crisis. As these reforms come to fruition, Mexico has great
potential for the same economic takeoff as experienced in Asian
NICs. As a result, the international business community cannot
afford to ignore this emerging country.
III. Legal Reforms in Mexican Foreign Investment Regime
Recent social, economic, and commercial developments in
Mexico have caused changes to important Mexican laws that
directly affect the participation of foreign parties in the Mexican
economy. The enactment of the new Foreign Investment Law has
significantly broadened investment opportunities in Mexico's
economic activities, which were restricted under the old law. 2 In
addition, the Mexican government has significantly strengthened
the intellectual property protection regime through the enactment
of the 1991 Law for the Promotion and Protection of Industrial
Property,' and a companion amendment in Mexico's Copyright
Law. 24 Moreover, Mexico's new maquiladora program also plays
a significant role in attracting foreign investment.2 All these legal
reforms are intended to improve Mexico's foreign investment
regime and attract foreign investors to participate in the Mexican
economy. Therefore, an understanding of these laws can be very
helpful to foreign investors who are making decisions about their
investment projects.
A. Foreign Investment Law
In order to strengthen Mexico's competitive position in
attracting foreign investment, Mexico recently enacted a new
Foreign Investment Law, which came into effect on December 28,
121 Mexico's geographical location is south of North America. It shares a 3234
kilometer border with the United States to the north and borders Guatemala and Belize
to its south. Mexico also possesses coastlines facing the Pacific Ocean in its West and
Caribbean Basin and Mexico Bay in its west.
122 See infra notes 126-64 and accompanying text.
123 See infra notes 165-94 and accompanying text.
124 See infra notes 195-213 and accompanying text.
125 See infra notes 214-49 and accompanying text.
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1993.26 This FIL repealed the complex, inward looking, and
defensive policies of its predecessor, the 1973 Foreign Investment
Law,"2 and dramatically changed the regulatory framework of
foreign investments in Mexico.128
1. Policy
The main purpose of the FIL is to define the rules applicable to
foreign investment in Mexico and to ensure that foreign
investment contributes to the economic development of Mexico. 29
However, an implicit objective of the new law is to provide legal
certainty and clear rules for foreign investors.3 Prior to the
enactment of the FIL, foreign investments in Mexico were
regulated by both the 1973 Foreign Investment Law and the 1989
Investment Regulation. 13 This two-track operation came about in
1989, when President Salinas used his prescriptive powers to
promulgate the regulations that substantially liberalized and
deregulated some provisions of the 1973 Law. However, under
the Mexican legal system, the regulations could be easily and
directly modified at-any time, thus reducing the level of certainty
in foreign investment.' In addition, the interaction of the 1973
Law and the 1989 Regulations also created a complicated
legislative environment because the 1989 Regulation exceeded the
scope of the 1973 law, in many respects.' Therefore, the
126 Ley de Inversi6n Extranjera, D.O., 27 Diciembre 1993 [Foreign Investment
Law, December 27, 1993], [hereinafter FIL]. For English text of the Mexican Foreign
Investment Law see DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, supra note 95, pt. IV, app. 2.
127 Ley para Promover la Inversion Mexicoana y Regular La Inversion Extranjera,
D.O., Mar. 9, 1973 (repealed 1993) [hereinafter 1973 Law].
128 1 DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, Part VI, § 1.02, at 1-4 (Andrea Bonime-Blanc &
William E. Mooz, Jr. ed. 1996)
129 FIL, supra note 126, art. 1.
130 Agustin Berdja-Prieto, Mexico Streamlines Foreign Investment Law, INT'L FIN.
L. REv., Feb. 1994; Raymond Bravo H., Mexican Legal Framework Applicable to
Operations Involving Financial Services, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1239, 1240-41 (1994).
131 Reglamento de la Ley para Promover la Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular Inversi6n
Extranjera 1989. [Regulation of the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to
Regulate Foreign Investment 1989], [hereinafter 1989 Regulation]. For English text of
1989 Regulation see DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, supra note 95, at Part IV app.4.
132 Bravo H., supra note 130, at 1241.
133 J. Hayden Kepner, Jr., Mexico's New Foreign Investment Regulations: A Legal
Analysis, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 41, 58-59 (1992). For instance, the 1973
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interaction between the 1973 Law and the 1989 Regulation raised
a number of . issues concerning the 1989 Regulation's
constitutionality and legality. 13 4 In response, the FIL has removed
these uncertainties and created a clearer legal framework for
foreign investments.
2. Definition and Scope of Foreign Investment
The new Mexican Foreign Investment Law substantially
broadens the definition of foreign investors and provides a greater
scope for foreign participation in its key economic sectors, as
compared to the 1973 Law. Almost all kinds of foreign investors
are permitted to invest in Mexico, including any "non-Mexican
individual, corporation, partnership, and any non-incorporated
foreign entities."'35 In addition, foreign investment is defined as (i)
the participation of foreign investors in any portion in the
corporate capital of Mexican companies, (ii) investment carried
out by Mexican companies in which foreign investors have a
majority equity participation, and (iii) the participation of foreign
investors in activities and acts contemplated by the FIL. 36
As a general rule, foreign investors have no restrictions
preventing (i) participation in any proportion in the corporate
capital of Mexican companies, (ii) the purchase of fixed assets,
(iii) joining new economic activities or producing new products, or
to (iv) opening, operating, expanding, and relocating existing
establishments. 37  Generally, this new regulatory framework
improves the restrictive 1973 law's strict limitation of foreign
investments in Mexican companies to 49 percent or less.
However, the FIL specifies four categories of activities in
which foreign investors are prohibited from participating. The
first category includes the activities exclusively reserved for the
Law requires prior approval for any foreigners having more than 49 percent ownership
of Mexican companies but the 1989 Regulation allows 100 percent foreign ownership in
most industries without requiring prior approvals. Id.
134 The 1989 Regulation seems to be unconstitutional because it is not consistent
with the 1973 Law. Id. at 72, 73. Thus, foreign investors could be vulnerable in
Mexico, if the 1989 Regulation were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of
the Mexico. Id. at 73.
135 FIL, supra note 126, art. 2, sec. III.
136 Id. sec. II.
137 Id. art. 4.
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Mexican state.' The FIL exclusively reserves for the Mexican
state certain strategic industries, such as oil and basic
petrochemicals, to comply with the Mexican constitutional
requirement."' Neither Mexican nor foreign investors may engage
in these restricted areas of economic activity.'40  The second
category includes activities such as radio broadcasting and land
transportation, which are reserved exclusively for Mexican
individuals and Mexican companies without foreign equity
participation. Foreign investors may not use any direct or
indirect mechanisms to engage in and obtain control of these
activities. 42 The third category includes activities in which foreign
investment may participate only in a minority position. For those
specified sectors, the FIL limits direct foreign ownership or
participation to either 10, 25, 30, or 49 percent. 43  The fourth
category includes activities where foreign investors are required to
obtain prior approval from the Foreign Investment Commission in
order to own more than 40 percent.'"
Although the economic sectors mentioned above have not been
expressly opened to foreign investment, the FIL does provide
other alternatives for foreign participation in these restricted
activities. For example, subject to a screening procedure, foreign
investors may participate in activities reserved for the Mexican
people through neutral investment with limited or non-voting
rights. 45  In addition, with prior approval of the Foreign
Investment Commission, foreign investors may acquire existing
138 Id. art. 5.
139 Id.
14' Id. art. 5.
141 FIL, supra note 126, art. 6.
142 Id. art. 7.
143 Id. These limitations are as follows: (i) up to 10 percent in production
cooperatives, (ii) up to 25 percent in domestic and specialized air transportation service,
(iii) up to 30 percent in financial holding companies, commercial banks, securities firms
and specialists, and (iv) up to 49 percent in other service industries, such as insurance,
financial, leasing, newspaper, publication, and telephone service. Id.
" FIL, supra note 126, art. 8. This category includes activities, such as maritime
transport and certain port services. Id.
145 Id. art. 19. Neutral investment means investment in a Mexican corporation or
partnership through authorized special trusts. Id. art 18. Such investment will not be
computed to determine the percentage of foreign investment in the capital of Mexican
company. Id.
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Mexican-owned companies regardless of the activities in which
these companies are engaged.' 6
3. Registration and Approval Procedures
The procedures of registration for foreign investments
regulated under the FIL have been simplified. As a general
requirement, all foreign investors are required to obtain a prior
permit from the Ministry of Foreign Relations when establishing a
corporation or partnership in Mexico. 47 The foreign investors
have to obtain prior approval from the Ministry of Commerce and
Industrial Development (SECOFI) to register in the Public
Commerce Registry in order to engage in economic activities in
Mexico. I48  The FIL also requires SECOFI, within 15 business
days, to grant such applications which comply with corresponding
legal requirements. 49  Furthermore, all foreign investments,
whether subject to prior approval or not, have to be registered with
the National Registry of Foreign Investment. 5'
For certain activities which are subject to the screening
procedures of the Foreign Investment Commission, foreign
investors need to file an application to obtain approval. 5' Article
29 of the FIL sets four criteria which the Foreign Investment
Commission must observe upon evaluating applications for
investment.'52 These criteria are: the impact on employment and
workers' training, technological contribution, environmental
concerns, and the contribution to competitiveness of Mexico's
manufacturing sector.' In addition, the Commission must have a
formal response to the application within 45 working days from its
presentation; otherwise, the application shall be deemed
approved.1 4 Obviously, the "deemed approval" concept is very
146 Id. art. 9.
141 Id. art. 15.
148 FIL, supra note 126, art. 17.
149 Id.
110 Id. art. 32.
'5' Id. art. 9.
152 Id. art. 29.
153 Id.
114 Id. art. 28.
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helpful in reducing bureaucratic impediments and in improving the
efficiency of foreign investment application procedures..
4. Capital Repatriation and Profit Remittance
The FIL Law does not impose any general restrictions or
limitations on the remittance of profits or repatriation of capital to
foreign countries, which is consistent with the Mexican
government's abolition of its foreign exchange control.'55
Therefore, there are no restrictions on the remittance of initial or
subsequent investments, when general legal requirements, such as
paying taxes, are met.
5. Acquisition of Real Estate Property
The FIL has greatly facilitated foreign access to Mexican real
estate by diminishing and removing the legal and bureaucratic
obstacles. In general, foreigners may hold. legal and beneficial
titles of real property outside the restricted zone in Mexico.'56
Within the restricted zone, the Mexican Constitution excludes
foreign access.'57 The FIL, however, narrowly interprets the
Mexican Constitution to soften the constitutional limitation in the
restricted zone and allows Mexican companies with foreign equity
to directly acquire real property for industrial or commercial use in
the restricted zone.'58 The only requirement is to register with the
Ministry of Foreign Relation.'59 The FIL also allows foreign
access indirectly to the restricted zone for residential use.
Foreigners may obtain a permit from the Ministry of Foreign
Relation and hold real estate for residential use through a Mexican
155 Jonathan E. Heath, Economic Perspectives for 1992, Bus. MEX., Dec. 1991,
available in LEXIS, World Lib., Txtcsa File. Since 1982, foreign exchange has been
subjected to restrictive government control and has been intended to curb capital flight.
Id. However, the Salinas administration abolished the foreign exchange controls in
November 1991 to be consistent with its free market oriented reforms. Id.
156 FIL, supra note 126, art. 10.
'57 Under article 27, section 1 of the Mexican Constitution, foreign individuals and
entities may not hold legal titles to real estate in Mexico located within 100 kilometer
from the border or 50 kilometers from the coastline. MEXICAN CONSTITUTION, supra
note 95, art. 27, § 1.
158 FIL, supra note 126, art. 10.
159 Id.
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trust.6' Additionally, the FIL prolongs such trusts to a term of 50
years, as opposed to 30 years under 1973 law. 161 In addition, the
"deemed approval" concept is also subject to a screening
procedure if the Ministry of Foreign Relations does not respond to
the application within 30 business days.'62
In general, the FIL has removed constitutional uncertainty and
enhanced legality in the foreign investment domain and thereby
created a more straightforward legal framework for foreign
investment. It has broadened and deregulated the foreign
investment scope and application procedures. As a result, the new
law creates a more transparent and investor-friendly set of'rules
and procedures for foreign investors in Mexico. However, the FIL
does not fully liberalize the scope of foreign investment, and still
imposes some restrictions in its foreign investment scope. 163 These
restrictions unavoidably limit foreign investors' participation in
Mexico's economic activities. Further, Mexico's peso crisis has
strongly shaken investors' confidence in Mexico and thereby has
influenced foreign investment inflow.'6 Therefore, the Mexican
government needs to first restore foreign investors' confidence. In
addition, the Mexican government has to further liberalize the
scope of foreign investment and ease the restrictions for foreign
participation in order to encourage more foreign investors to
participate Mexico's economy.
B. Law on the Promotion and Protection of Industrial
Property
On June 27, 1991, Mexico enacted the Law on the Promotion
and Protection of Industrial Property'65 and repealed the 1982
160 Id. art. I I
161 Id. art. 13.
162 Id. art. 14.
163 See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
164 Elisabeth Malkin, It's Better in La Provincia, Bus. WK., Nov. 13, 1995, at 118.
Due to the peso crisis, the inflow of direct foreign investment has significantly decreased
to less than half of 1994's $8 billion. Id.
165 Ley de Fomento y Protecion dela Propiedad Industrial [Law on the Promotion
and Protection of Industrial Property], was enacted on June 27, 1991, and most redcently
amended in August 2, 1994, [hereinafter The Industrial Property Law]. For English text
of The Industrial Property Law see DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, supra note 95, at Part
III, app. 2.
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Transfer of Technology Law and the Transfer of Technology
Regulations of 1990.'6 The Industrial Property Law completely
rebuilds the Mexican industrial property regime by integrating
new intellectual properties and by extending its term of
protection. This law also indicates Mexico's great efforts in
moving toward a global economy framework.
1. Policy
The Industrial Property Law expresses as its objective the
protection of industrial property rights, such as patents and
trademarks, through increased regulation, enforcement, and
penalties. 16 The law is also designed to help Mexican businesses
produce new technologies as part of Mexico's efforts at
modernization 6 9 and to leave behind the economic debacle of the
1980s. Moreover, an unstated policy of enacting the Industrial
Property Law is to strengthen Mexico's attractiveness to foreign
investors.7 The law signals to potential foreign investors that the
technology they bring with them to Mexico will be protected
under a regulatory system similar to that of industrialized
nations. 7' As a result, Mexico has dramatically eliminated another
barrier to foreign investment and has fostered a good business
climate to attract foreign investments and advanced technology.
2. Scope and Term
The Industrial Property Law significantly broadens protection
for the following categories of goods:
a. Patents, Utility Models, and Industrial Designs
The Industrial Property law specifically broadens its patentable
scope to chemicals, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology products,
166 DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, supra note 95, pt. IV, § 1.01, at 1-2.
167 See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
168 See infra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
169 The Industrial Property Law, supra note 165, art. 2.
170 Jorge Arciniega and Nancy Ramirez, Mexico's New Industrial Property Law-
New Protection for Foreign Investors, I MEx. TRADE & L. REP. No. 1, Oct. 1, 1991,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Mtlr File.
171 Id.
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alloys and agrochemical products.'72 The term of a, patent is 20
years from the date of filing the application.' The Industrial
Property Law also introduces utility models as a new form of
protection and gives a non-renewable 10 years of protection.
7 4
The idea is to encourage industrial innovation among small
companies and individuals because they normally have limited
research and development resources which are instrumental in
producing patentable innovations. " 5 Since most Mexican
companies are small and medium-size entrepreneurialships, the
protection of utility models is particularly suitable for local
Mexican companies. The protection of utility models also
represents an incentive for investment by NICs, such as Taiwan,
which have industrial structures similar to those of Mexico.'76 The
Industrial Property Law also allows protection for industrial
designs that may take the form of either drawings or models for a
nonrenewable 15 years."'
b. Commercial Designations
The Industrial Property Law allows collective marks, which
are issued by industry associations to designate the products or
services of their respective members, to be registered for
protection in Mexico.'78 In addition, trademarks, service marks,
trade names, and commercial slogans may also be registered for
renewable terms of 10 years from the date of filing the
application. 7 9
172 See The Industrial Property Law, supra note 165, art. 16.
173 Id. art. 23. The original patentable term in Transfer Technology Law is 14
years. See DOING BUSINESS, supra note 95, at pt. IV, § 2.02, at 2-6.
17 The Industrial Property Law, supra note 165, art. 28, 29.
1'5 John B. McKnight & Carlos Muggenburg R.V., Mexico's New Intellectual
Property Regime: Improvements in the Protection of Industrial Property, Copy, License,
and Franchise Rights in Mexico, 27 INT'L LAW. 27,33 (1993).
176 Philip Liu, Taiwan: Government Steps Up Help for Small and Medium
Enterprises, Bus. TA wAN, Sept. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library Txtfe
File. 96.5 percent of the companies in Taiwan are small and medium-size companies.
Id.
177 The Industrial Property Law, supra note 165, art. 36.
178 Id. art. 96.
179 Id. arts. 95, 103, 110.
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c. Industrial or Trade Secrets
The Industrial Property Law also recognizes the need to
protect industrial secrets. An industrial secret is information which
gives a party a competitive or economic advantage against third
parties, or is the subject of adequate methods or practices to ensure
its confidential nature and restricted'access.8  The extension of
protection to industrial secrets shows Mexico's effort to attract
foreign investors who have nonpatentable know-how which can
contribute to Mexico's competitiveness and economic advantage.
However, the protection of industrial secrets is still controversial.
Since a secret is confidential to the parties, it should not be subject
to disclosure in order to obtain the government's authorization or
registration. ' In addition, the subjective nature of the statutory
elements constituting industrial secrets are difficult to prove."'
The current absence of injunctive relief for unauthorized
disclosure or use of secrets also raises serious doubts about its
effectiveness in industrial secret protection under the Industrial
Property Law.'83 Therefore, the protection of industrial secrets
seems meaningless to investors.
3. License and Transfer of Technology Procedures
The Industrial Property Law tries to reduce the technology
transfer barriers to a minimum. It eliminated SECOFI's screening
procedure of the terms of the parties' license and transfer
agreement which was imposed by the 1982 Transfer of
Technology Law. 114 It only requires registration of patents and
trademark licensing and transfers with the SECOFI to effectively
protect the transfers or licensing against improper use by third
180 Id. art. 82.
1s Mcknight & Muggenburg R.V., supra note 175, at 34.
182 Id.
183 Intellectual Property Enforcement Issues to Play Major Role in NAFTA, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 42, at 1553 (Oct. 23, 1991). Historically, the Mexican judicial
system has not recognized pretrial remedies. Id. Mexico's enforcement "depends on a
mixture of civil, administrative, and criminal procedures," and thus injunctive relief is
not a part of the Mexican legal system, as it is in the U.S., where interlocutory
injunctions play a prime role. Id.
184 Arciniega & Ramirez, supra note 170.
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parties. I"5 In addition, requirement for registration of a licensing or
transfer has also been improved. The Industrial Property Law only
denies registration of a licensing or transfer when such a trademark
is not effectively registered in Mexico. i16 Therefore, the improved
licensing and transfer procedures under the Industrial Property
Law is likely to facilitate the flow of foreign technology into
Mexico.
4. Protection and Enforcement
Because of the infamous reputation of piracy in Mexico, the
Industrial Property Law specifically provides for a three-tier
protection for a legal holder of industrial property."7 First, it
provides several administrative measures, such as on-site
inspection of locations where goods violating the industrial
property law are suspected to exist.18 Secondly, it incriminates the
misappropriator and unauthorized user, if the purpose of the use is
for the attainment of economic benefit.'. Finally, the industrial
property holder may also bring civil action for his damages against
the infringer.9" In most cases, civil actions are brought
contemporaneously with the initiation of administrative or
criminal proceedings in order to reduce the litigation period.'
Nevertheless, due to the slowness of the Mexican judiciary system
and its offering of considerably smaller compensation than
developed countries, the incentive for pursuing civil damages for
an infringement may not be significant to the holders of industrial
property rights in Mexico. 192 Therefore, the underlying concern
among foreign investors is whether the enforcement measures
provided by the Industrial Property Law will be effectively
implemented.' 93  Effective implementation of enforcement
185 The Industrial Property Law, supra note 165, arts. 62, 63, 136, 143.
186 Id.
187 See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
188 The Industrial Property Law, supra note 165, art. 211.
189 Id. art. 223.
190 Id. art. 226.
191 See Intellectual Property Enforcement Issues to Play a Major Role in NAFTA,
supra note 183.
192 Id.
193 McKnight, & Muggenburg R.V., supra note 175, at 47.
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measures will determine whether foreign investors' claims will be
handled quickly by the relevant tribunal as well as whether
sufficient money will be allocated to fund the government
agencies carrying out the protection devices. 94  The Mexican
government's success in attracting foreign investment and
technology depends on these enforcement issues. Thus, to
efficiently and effectively encourage the technology transfers, the
Mexican government still needs to put great effort into convincing
the foreign investors that their technologies will truly be protected
in Mexico.
C. Copyright Law Reforms
On July 17, 1991, in a companion piece of legislation to the
Industrial Property Law, the Mexican Congress enacted the decree
"Reform and Add Various Provisions to the Federal Law of
Authors' Rights" (the Decree) to amend its Copyright Law.'95 The
fundamental policy of the copyright law amendment is to conform
to the standards set by the Universal Copyright Convention 9 6 and
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literacy and Artistic
Works.' 97 Since Mexico has membership in both conventions, the
Decree has assured foreigners that they will have protection for
their copyright works in Mexico.' 8
The Decree makes various reforms to the Mexican Copyright
Law to improve copyright protection. The most important of these
reforms is to extend the protection of the Mexican Copyright Law
to computer software, as well as to other areas of intellectual
194 Id.
195 Mexico's Copyright Law Revised, 1 MEx. TRADE & L. REP. No. 3, Dec. 1, 1991,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Mtlr File.
196 Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2732, 216 U.N.T.S.
132, revised in Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943
U.N.T.S. 178.
197 Berne Convention for Protection of Literacy and Artistic Works, Paris Revision,
done on July 24, 1971, reprinted in M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 4 THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT, app. 27 (1987). For an overview of interaction between Berne and the
U.C.C., see Ralph Oman, The United States and the Berne Union: An Extended
Courtship, 3 J. L. & TECH 71, 75 (1988).
198 M. Sean McMillen et al., Mexico's Intellectual Property Law, 15 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 975, 978 (1993).
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property. 9 Thus far, the Mexican government has denied granting
patents for computer software,"* leaving the Decree to provide the
only effective mechanism for protecting computer software in
Mexico. The Decree specifically amends article 7 of the Mexicah
Copyright Law to extend its protection for computer software
programs and audiovisual works. Therefore, protection against
unauthorized infringement, such as copying and distributing,
formerly applied to books and musical compositions is now also
applicable to software programs. In addition, the length of
copyright protection has been increased from 30 to 50 years."'
However, the copyright works registration is not mandatory in
Mexico." ' But a software owner is still entitled to identify itself as
the sole legitimate source of the software and to take action against
any unauthorized reproductions in Mexico, even if a software
program is not registered with the Copyright Bureau."3 However,
registering in the Copyright Bureau is generally recommended in
order to effectively support the position that the work qualifies for
copyright protection.0 4 To encourage software owners to register
in the Copyright Bureau, the Decree also enhances confidentiality
regarding copyright registration of their programs. 5 Accessing the
files of software registrations can only be done through the
consent of the Copyright Bureau or a judicial order.0 6 Moreover,
to discourage piracy, the decree also increased the criminal and
civil penalties against infringers."'
In general, the copyright law reforms are intended to foster a
favorable business climate to attract foreign investment,
particularly in the computer industry. However, whether the
reformed copyright law meets the expectations of foreign investors
199 See Mexico's Copyright Law Revised, supra note 195.
200 Mexico Lures High-Tech Exports by Reform of investment, Intellectual Property
Laws, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 37, at 1583, 1584 (Sept. 22, 1993).
201 See id. at 1583-84.
202 McKnight, & Muggenburg R.V, supra note 175, at 38.
203 Id.
204 Id. at n.58.
205 Mexico's Copyright Law Revised, supra note 195.
206 Id.
207 Id.
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will depend upon the extent the new laws are enforced." 8 The
Mexican government vows to put its teeth into the new laws, and
foreign investors have praised the Mexican federal attorney
general's office for its actions on copyright infringement. °
Nevertheless, the Mexican court system represents another barrier
to the protection of foreign investors' copyrights. The U.S. firms
Microsoft and Autodesk brought the first legal actions for
copyright infringement under the reformed law.210 In their civil
actions, they experienced highly unreliable court action due to
211inefficiency and corruption, which permeate the court system.
Without a reliable court system in Mexico, foreign investors will
doubt whether their legitimate rights can be truly protected in
Mexico. Therefore, the Mexican government must also accelerate
its pace on reconstructing its judicial system in order to effectively
protect and assure foreign copyright holders. As it now stands,
most copyright owners first pursue criminal action
contemporaneously with civil action against infringers to
effectively stop the infringement and reduce the lengthy court
litigation process. Then, the copyright owners usually reach
settlements out of court with the infringers and receive some
reimbursement. 3
D. The Maquiladora Program
Mexico's maquiladora program is a highly significant force for
Mexico in promoting foreign capital inflow, employment and
industrialization. This program was originated in 1965 as part of
the Mexico Border Industrialization Program. 4 The maquiladora
program allows foreign manufacturers to temporarily import duty
208 Id.
209 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 4.2 Protection of Intellectual Property,
INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD: MEXICO, Sept. 1995, at 21, 23.
210 Id.
211 See id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Joshua Cohen, A Case Study of Internationalization, the Rise of the
Maquiladora, Bus. MEX., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 52, 53. In 1964, the U.S. repealed its
Bracero Program, which allowed Mexican workers to enter the U.S. and work for
seasonal farms. See id. Fearing high unemployment, Mexico established a maquiladora
program as part of implementing its Border Industrialization Program. Id. at 52.
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free intermediate materials which are used to assemble a product
in Mexico, and subsequently export the product to the country of
origin of the intermediate materials."5 In the early 1980's, a
devaluation of the peso led to a sharp decline in Mexican wages in
relation to the dollar and boosted the growth of the maquiladora
industry.216  Therefore, by integrating low cost and profound
human resources with special customs treatment, the maquiladora
program has become an effective mechanism for Mexico in
attracting foreign investment. 7
In the past decade, the maquiladora industry has blossomed
and contributed to Mexico's economy. Since the conception of the
maquiladora, several presidential decrees have modified regulation
of the maquiladora industry in response to changes in Mexico's
economy. On December 23, 1993, Mexico published the Decree
for the Development and Operation of the In-Bond Assembly
(Maquiladora) Industry and effected the decree on January 1,
1994."8 The fundamental object of the new Maquiladora Decree is
to provide an expedited and decentralized mechanism to facilitate
the operations of maquiladora corporations.21 9 In addition, the
1994 decree has softened its mandatory export requirement as a
response to the passage of NAFTA.22 °
1. Registration and Approval Procedures
The procedures of registration for maquiladora operation have
been simplified under the Maquiladora Decree. As a general
requirement, a foreign investor needs to have a corporate presence
in Mexico to obtain the approval of a maquiladora operation.' In
addition to the standard requirements associated with forming any
215 See Mexico's Maquiladora Industry, supra note 83.
216 Economic Comparisons, supra note 18.
217 Daniel B. Wood, An Economic Give and Take With Tijuana, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File.
218 Foreign Tax Law Association, Inc., TAX L. WORLD: MEX. BOOK III 85 (1996)
(setting forth the English Translation of the Mexican Maquiladora Decree). The Decree
for the Development and Operation of the In-Bond Assembly (Maquiladora) Industry,
effective Jan. 1, 1994, will hereinafter be referred to as the "1994 Maquiladora Decree".
219 Id. (setting forth Article 1 of the 1994 Maquiladora Decree).
220 See DOING BUSINEss IN MEXICO, supra note 128, pt. VI, § 6.01, at 6-3.
221 DOING BUsINESS IN MEXICO, supra note 128, pt. VI, § 6.01, at 6-4.
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company in Mexico, investors must apply to obtain a permit from
SECOFI for their maquiladora operations.222 A device, called the
"Single Outlet," has been installed to facilitate the registration
procedure. The outlet will carry out all the approval procedures,
such as registrations in the National Commission of Foreign
Investment and Federal Taxpayers Registry of the Ministry of
Finance and Public Credit, through a single format. 3 Four criteria
need to be met in order to obtain SECOFI's approval. The
maquiladora company must: 1) generate employment, 2)
contribute foreign currency, 3) foster the integration and
competitiveness of the Mexican industry, and 4) facilitate
technology transfers. 4  Once the maquiladora registration is
approved, SECOFI will assign a maquiladora registry number to
the qualified maquiladora applicant.225 This number must be used
in all governmental matters.
In order to reduce bureaucratic impediments and facilitate the
operation of the newly established maquiladora companies, the
Maquiladora Decree also requires the SECOFI to notify the
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit about the terms of the
approval within three business days from the date of approval.226
Then the new maquiladora corporation can proceed with the
temporary importation treatment for its production.
2. Temporary Importation
As mentioned above, the distinctive characteristic of the
maquiladora company is its capability for temporary, duty-free
importation. The Maquiladora Decree allows qualified
maquiladora companies to temporarily import raw materials,
equipment, machinery, and in general, anything needed to
implement its activities and achieve its production goals, without
222 Foreign Tax Law Association, Inc., supra note 218, at 85-86 (setting forth
Articles 3 and 5 of the 1994 Maquiladora Decree). The permit also contains general
information and approved terms of the maquiladora companies such as the
manufacturing process and necessary equipment and raw materials to be temporarily
imported. Id.
223 Id. (setting forth Article 3 of the 1994 Maquiladora Decree).
224 Id. at 85 (setting forth Article 2 of the 1994 Maquiladora Decree).
225 Id. at. 86 (setting forth Article 7 of the 1994 Maquiladora Decree).
226 See id. (setting forth Article 9 of the 1994 Maquiladora Decree).
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paying any applicable customs duties.227
To guarantee that the imported items will be timely re-
exported, the Mexican Customs Department requires a
maquiladora company to post a surety bond.2 8 The Mexican
Customs Department will call upon the surety bond if the bonding
maquiladora company cannot present evidence that the goods have
been re-exported as required.229
3. Domestic Maquiladora Sales
Prior to NAFTA, maquiladoras could, under certain
conditions, sell their products to the Mexican market for up to 50
percent of their total export sales during the preceding 12
months.23° In response to the passage of NAFTA, however, the
Maquiladora Decree has softened the mandatory export
requirement somewhat. Beginning in 1994, a maquiladora was
allowed to sell 55 percent of the total value of its annual exports
for the previous year to the Mexican domestic market.2 11 The
quantity limitation will also be gradually eliminated because the
decree will annually increase the quantity by 5 percent in addition
to the 55 percent until the year of 2000.232 In 2001, maquiladoras
will then be able to sell their goods domestically without
quantitative limitation.233 In addition, the Maquiladora Decree
requires the maquiladora companies to report the domestic sales to
SECOFI.234  Furthermore, all the products of maquiladora
companies for domestic sale must maintain the same quality
standard as those products for export and the companies must pay
227 See id. (setting forth Article 10 of the 1994 Maquiladora Decree).
228 Rodolfo Villalobos & Bruce B. Barshop, Social Infrastructure Needs of the
Maquiladora Industry: A Proposal for United States Corporate Contributions, 22 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 701, 705 (1991).
229 Cheryl D. Hein & Neal R. Van Zante, Maquiladoras: Should U.S. Companies
Run for the Border? CPA J., Oct. 1991, at 14, 16. This requirement also explains why
maquiladoras are often called "in-bond assembly plants." See Villabos & Barshop,
supra note 228.
230 1989 Mexican Maquiladora Decree, art. 20.
231 See Foreign Tax Law Association, Inc., supra note 218, at 88 (setting forth
Article 19 of the 1994 Maquiladora Decree).
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 89 (setting forth Article 20 of the 1994 Maquiladora Decree).
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the general import tax.235
.The expansion of maquiladora domestic sales also serves
another purpose for the Mexican government. Since most
maquiladoras are concentrated along the United States-Mexico
border, the Mexican government has tried hard to encourage the
maquiladoras to move into the interior of Mexico and to stimulate
the economies in those regions. 36 Therefore, the liberalization of
maquiladora domestic sales will likely accelerate the interior
movement of maquiladoras.
4. Future Development ofMaquiladoras
Before the establishment of NAFTA, special U.S. tariff
concessions served as a competitive advantage to maquiladoras for
those investors aiming at exporting to the U.S. market.237 The
maquiladora production has enjoyed favorable tariff treatment
provided by the U.S. government through the Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP) program and the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule (HTS) production-sharing tariff provisions. Under the
HTS provisions 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80, U.S. Customs
provides benefits for maquiladora products which contain U.S.-
made components destined for the United States. 39 Only value
added portions produced in Mexico are liable for tariffs or
duties.24 ' The taxable value added portion is equal to the material,
labor, and overhead costs incurred in Mexico.24'
However, NAFTA changes the role of the maquiladoras.
Eventually maquiladoras in their strictest definition will disappear
235 Id. (setting forth Article 23.0 of the 1994 Maquiladora Decree).
236 David G. Walter, Win/Win Maquiladoras, TRANSP. & DISTRIBUTION, Feb. 1992,
at 38, 40.
237 See infra notes 239-241 and accompanying text.
238 Elsie L. Echeverri-Carrol, Maquiladoras: An Industry in Transition, TEX. Bus.
REv. June 1993.
239 See Mexico's Maquiladora Industry, supra note 83.
240 Under provision 9802.00.80, products assembled in foreign countries such as
Mexico from component parts from the United States, are subject to duties only on the
value-added portion. Mexico's Maquiladora Industry, supra note 83. Harmonize Tariff
Schedule (HTS) 9802.00.60 provides duty-free tariff treatment for certain metal
products from the United States which are processed in a foreign country and returned to
the United States for further processing. Id.
241 See Hein & Van Zante, supra note 229, at 14.
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due to tariff elimination by NAFTA. As was the case under the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement,2 42 the use of the production-
sharing tariff provisions will likely diminish because the
maquiladoras can trade goods duty-free, providing that their
products comply with rules of origin under NAFTA.243
Nevertheless, the tariff phase out period will be gradual because
the full duty elimination for certain items scheduled will be as late
as January 1, 2001.244 During the period of tariff elimination, the
maquiladoras can continue to benefit from production-sharing
tariff provisions to export their products to the United States.
Consequently, the maquiladora program will retain tariff
advantages for foreign investors for a number of years.
Although its temporary importation mechanism will be
gradually eliminated by NAFTA, the maquiladora industry is
expected to grow prosperously, at least in the near future. This
expectation is based on the ground that the maquiladora industry
will benefit from NAFTA-related trade diversion to North
American sourcing. 45 The recent performance of maquiladora
operations can support such an expectation. In September, 1995,
the maquiladora industry enjoyed a 28.3 percent real increase in its
value added production over September, 1994 levels.246  In
addition, the recent sharp devaluation of the Mexican peso is likely
to boost the growth of the maquiladora industry because the
Mexican labor wage has also significantly plunged in terms of its
dollar base.2 47  Moreover, in order to strengthen their
242 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22-23, 1987 & Jan.. 2, 1988, Can.-
U.S., reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281, 293-402 (1988).
243 See NAFTA Will Greatly Improve Access to Mexican Market for Maquila
Goods, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 14, at 551 (Apr. 6, 1994).
244 See text accompanying notes 272-292.
245 See Janet Duncan, Japanese See Trade Benefits in Mexico with NAFTA,
REUTERS, Nov. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtcsa File.
246 Mexico: Mexico's Preliminary Sept Trade Surplus $904 MLN, REUTERS, Oct.
19, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtcsa File.
247 Thomas Black, Peso's Fall Boosts Maquiladoras, GANNETT, Jan. 5, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtcsa File. The average labor costs account for at
least 50 percent of maquiladora operation costs. Id. As the peso plunges, the production
costs will also decrease significantly. Id. Therefore, the maquiladora products will
become more competitive in the international market because foreign investors working
with dollars in maquiladora operations are gaining considerable, unanticipated savings.
See id.
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competitiveness, many U.S. companies are moving into a "Just-in-
Time" (JIT) manufacturing system, which requires their suppliers
to be physically closer to their operations. 4  The maquiladora
operations can also help investors to replicate the trend of the JIT
manufacturing system. With Mexico's geographic advantage,
foreign investors can integrate their maquiladoras into their North
American customers' production sharing networks and thus,
quickly respond to the manufacturing strategies of their North
American customers. Their maquiladoras can be located on the
U.S.-Mexico border and can carry out labor intensive production,
then immediately re-export semi-finished products back to the
U.S.
In general, the Mexican maquiladora program does indeed
provides economic benefits to both Mexico and foreign investors.
Nevertheless, the restrictive rules of origin and elimination of
tariff concessions under NAFTA would make the maquiladora
industry less attractive. In addition, other factors, such as
infrastructure problems, inadequate supply of professional and
skilled labor, and high employee turnover would also restrain the
continued attractiveness of the maquiladora program.2 49 Therefore,
to make the maquiladora program more attractive to foreign
investors, the Mexican government needs to solve these problems.
Furthermore, the Mexican government has to restructure the
maquiladora industry from mere export-oriented assembly to full-
scale manufacturing. From this perspective, a replication of the
strategies that were used in Asian NICs, such as Taiwan and South
Korea, are necessary for the Mexican government to successfully
move from an assembly-for-export industry to a direct
manufacturing industry.
248 The JIT system is designed to reduce inventory to the minimal level through
producing or delivering goods or services as need. JUDIE KRAJEWSKI & BARBARA
RITZMAN, OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT STRATEGY AND ANALYSIS 696 (1993). Therefore,
it is necessary for the suppliers to be near the plants in order to facilitate customers' JIT
operation. Id. at 702. As the inventory has been reduced, the production costs will also
be reduced, and thus the products will become more cost competitive. Id.
249 Mexico's Maquiladora Industry, supra note 83.
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IV. Using the Comparative Advantages of NAFTA
A. Economic Benefits of NAFTA
Economically, NAFTA provides its most significant
advantages to North America. Economists believe the greatest
gains in efficiency and growth tend to come from the integration
of those nations which have greatly different labor and
productivity levels, and capital market and natural resource
conditions.20  The great difference in the nations labor, capital,
and natural resources markets also means a great difference in
their comparative advantages, and thus, the possibility for
economic efficiency and growth in'the integration of these nations
tends to be extremely large. 2 '  Building upon this theory, the
possibility for NAFTA to reach great aggregate gains is very large
because contracting countries have considerably different levels of
labor, capital, and natural resources. Several studies also support
the conclusion that NAFTA is likely to produce net aggregate
gains for each of the member countries in both the short and long
term."' An empirical evaluation from the International Trade
Commission generally estimated that the U.S. and Canada would
have long term gains with a 0.5 percent real GDP growth.
253
Similarly, Mexico is projected to experience a 0.1 to 11.4 percent
real GDP growth.254
NAFTA, like other free trade agreements, would also lead to
250 RICHARD S. BELOUS & JONATHAN LEMCO, NAFTA AS A MODEL OF
DEVELOPMENT 4 (1993); see also PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTEFELD,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: TRADE AND POLICY 24-27, 110, 114 (1991).
251 Id.
252 These studies include a report compiled by the United States International Trade
Commission. U.S.I.T.C., Potential Impact on The U.S. Economy and Selected
Industries of The North American Free-Trade Agreement, Investigation No. 332-337.
USITC Publication 2596. 7 (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter U.S.I.T.C., Selected Industries]. The
report is prepared by the U.S.I.T.C. at the request of Congress to weight the benefits of
NAFTA among the three players involved and support such conclusion. Id. The
Washington D.C. based Institute for International Economics also reached the same
result. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT
(1993); Timothy J. Kehoe, Assessing The Economic Impact of North American Free
Trade, in THE NAFTA DEBATE 21, 30-33 (M. Delal Baer & Sidney Weintraub eds.,
1994).
253 U.S.I.T.C., Selected Industries, supra note 252.
254 Id.
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trade creation and trade diversion.255 According to mainstream
economic theory, the establishment of a regional trading bloc, such
as a free trade area or customs union, is based on the principle of
preferences.256 The nations within the bloc have advantages that
are not granted to nations outside the bloc. Therefore, regional
trading bloc member countries may veil their protectionism nature
through practicing discriminative preferences, such as tariff and
non-tariff barriers, to non-member nations.257 This practice leads
to both trade creation and trade diversion.258
For trade creation effects, Mexico may benefit from the
elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, such as
quotas, licenses, and technical barriers, and thereby easily access
the free-trade bloc and free flow of its products through the North
American market. It can also enjoy the important dynamic effects
on the increasing free-trade market, such as stimulation of
technical change, stimulation of investment, and economies of
scale.259
In addition, NAFTA further magnifies the strength of
Mexico's comparative advantages and thereby undermines its
competitors in the North American market. The discriminative
nature of the free trade bloc will become exaggerated if interest
groups within the region deliberately pursue protectionist policies,
such as rules of origin, quotas, and special sanitary or
phytosanitary regulation. Therefore, the trade diversion will be
amplified in order to yield more production within the region.
260
NAFTA unavoidably follows this paradigm and will have trade
255 Trade creation occurs when the removal of trade barriers leads to new trade of
goods and services among members of the trading bloc that previously did not occur and
trade creation leads to the positive, efficient result of free trade. Richard H. Steinberg,
Antidotes to Regionalism: Responses to Trade Diversion Effects of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 315, 320 (1993). In contrast, trade
diversion occurs when the formation of the preferential trading bloc merely diverts trade
away from nonmembers to members of the trade bloc. Id. It will have an adverse
impact on nonmembers of the trade bloc and will lead to less efficiency and welfare. Id.
256 RICHARD S. BELOUS & REBECCA S. HARTLEY, THE GROWTH OF REGIONAL
TRADING BLOCS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 4 (1990).
257 Id.
258 Steinberg, supra note 255.
259 Effects on Trade with Nonmember Countries, 3 MEX. TRADE & L. REP. No. 3,
Mar. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Mtlr File.
260 Steinberg, supra note 255, at 322-23.
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diversionary effects in the Caribbean region, other Latin American
countries, and Asia. The hardship of protectionist mechanisms
under NAFTA inevitably blunts non-NAFTA exports in the
NAFTA market. Even though some of these countries enjoy
special tariff treatments, such as duty free export to Mexico's
northern neighbors, the removal of trade barriers to imports from
Mexico has undermined their receiving special treatment in the
North American market. 6'
The undermining of extra-regional competitors can be seen in
the example of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) countries. 62
The elimination of trade barriers under NAFTA causes significant
tariff and quota disparities between Mexico and CBI countries.
This disparity unavoidably depreciates the assets of the CBI and
places the CBI countries at a competitive disadvantage in terms of
access to the U.S. markets. The World Bank has estimated that 36
percent of Caribbean exports to the U.S. will be potentially
displaced by NAFTA.2 63 The U.S. has also identified that NAFTA
would result in severe repercussions for the economies of CBI
nations and, therefore, the U.S. intends to grant CBI beneficiaries
NAFTA-like tariff and, import quota treatment. 64 Nevertheless,
261 U.S.I.T.C., Review of Trade and.Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico
and Prospects for Future United States-Mexican Relations., Phase II: Summary of Views
on Prospects for Future United States-Mexican Relations, Investigation No. 332-282,
U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 2326.5 (Oct., 1990) [hereinafter U.S.I.T.C., Phase II: Summary of
Views].
262 In 1983, the U.S. Congress passed the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369 (1983), to implement President Reagan's Caribbean
Basin Initiative. 19 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988). The legislation is designed to promote the
revitalization and expanded private sector opportunities in the Caribbean Basin region.
The centerpiece of the act is the unilateral provision of trade preferences for a wide
range of U.S. imports from the region.
263. Richard L. Bernal, From NAFTA to Hemisphere Free Trade; North American
Free Trade Agreement, COL. J. WORLD Bus. 22, 25 (1994).
264 The U.S. Congress has introduced a bill to upgrade CBI by way of the
Caribbean Basin Free Trade Agreement Act. Gibbons Urges Consideration of Bill to
Protect Caribbean Nations From NAFTA, 10 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1080
(June 30, 1993); Caribbean Says Parity with Mexico on Textile Trade is a Necessity, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 50, at 1956, (Dec. 21, 1994). This act would aim at
protecting CBI beneficiaries from the possible adverse effects of NAFTA. Id. In
addition, the Clinton Administration has also decided to seek congressional approval for
an Interim Trade Program for the countries of the Caribbean Basin. Id. The Interim
Trade Program also tends to give CBI nations NAFTA-like treatment in the area of
textile and apparel. Id.
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the proposal of giving CBI parity treatment has not reached
consensus in the U.S. Congress and, therefore, whether CBI
nations can enjoy parity treatment is still uncertain."' Assuming
CBI beneficiaries will enjoy parity treatment with Mexico, they
still cannot compete with Mexico in the future. This lack of
competitiveness occurs because Mexico's inexpensive labor,
energy, transportation costs and the economies of scale will still
pose strong competitive advantages over the CBI countries.
With the undermining of its extra-regional competitors,
Mexico will attract more foreign investors to move their North
American production bases into Mexico. As the production bases
start to operate, intra-regional trade between Mexico and its
NAFTA partners is likely to increase substantially, a result which
can already be seen in the recent trade performance within the
NAFTA parties. The overall level of Mexico's trade with the U.S.
increased by 18.4 percent in the first half of 1994.266 Trade with
Canada also increased by 42 percent in the first five months of
1994."' Furthermore, the sharp devaluation of the Mexican peso
will further make Mexican products more competitive in the
NAFTA market.268
More importantly, NAFTA can help Mexico to create a stable
economic environment that will encourage long-term private
investment in Mexico. The stability of Mexico's investment
environment could be achieved in the following ways. First,
NAFTA would reinforce the Mexican government's effort to
continue its ongoing market-oriented economic reforms. 69 The
continuation of these reforms will ensure Mexico's real annual
growth and its falling rates of inflation. NAFTA will also shield
Mexican products from protectionist tendencies of its northern
neighbors - tendencies which fluctuate with the business cycle and
265 House Democrats Ask President Clinton To Keep CBI Parity Proposal Off
Table, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 7 (Jan. 3, 1996).
266 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: MEXICO 24 (4th quarter
1994).
267 Id.
268 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
269 Timothy J. Kehoe, Assessing The Economic Impact of North American Free
Trade, in THE NAFTA DEBATE 21 (M. Delal Baer & Sidney Weintraub eds., 1994).
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are sensitive to a variety of special interest groups.27 Moreover,
NAFTA will lead to a more predictable business environment,
reducing risks associated with investment and other business
decisions in the North American market. 1 As a result, the
establishment of NAFTA has created a favorable investment
climate in Mexico.
B. Elimination of Tariffs
Within fifteen years after its effectiveness, the NAFTA text
provides for the elimination of all tariffs currently applicable to
goods traded among the NAFTA partners.272 At the end of fifteen
years, all products traded within the NAFTA market will be
entitled to duty-free entry if they meet the NAFTA origin rules.273
1. Staged Reduction of Import Duties
NAFTA prohibits the Parties from increasing existing tariffs or
adopting any tariffs on an originating good except as provided by
NAFTA.274 NAFTA also phases out customs duties on originating
goods over certain time periods consistent with the Parties'
Schedule to Annex 302.2, or as indicated in Annex 300-B.2"
Generally, NAFTA continues the duty-free status of products
which existed before NAFTA's establishment. In addition,
NAFTA immediately reduces tariffs to zero on a significant
proportion of imports between NAFTA partners.276 The tariffs on
most products will also be eliminated linearly over a period of five
to fifteen years.277  The length of the tariff elimination of a
particular product depends on how sensitive this product is to the
respective country.278 In general, the more sensitive the product is
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 See infra notes 274-85 and accompanying text.
273 See infra note 293-331 and accompanying text for a discussion of country of
origin rules.
274 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 302.1
275 Id. annex 302 (2).
276 Id. annex 302.2 § 1, (a-e).
277 Id.
278 Id.
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considered to the respective party, the longer the phase-out
period.279 The longest period is fifteen years." For example, U.S.
tariffs on ceramic tile and most household glassware will be
eliminated within a fifteen-year period.' The base rates under the
tariff elimination schedule are those tariff rates generally in effect
on July 1, 1991, including rates under the U.S. GSP program and
the General Preferential Tariff of Canada.282
Certain particularly sensitive products, such as sugar and syrup
goods, are subject to tariff rate quotas under NAFTA.2 3  These
tariff rate quotas give two levels of tariff rates. They allow a
limited amount of the product to access the U.S. market at a
reduced rate (the "in-quota" tariff rate), while a higher duty rate
(the "over-quota" tariff rate) applies to any portion exceeding the
quota.284 Both of these level tariff rates are then reduced over a
fixed period. 5
2. Elimination of Duty Drawback Program
NAFTA countries have various customs programs that
generally enable companies to avoid duties by providing for the
refund or waiver of duties upon the exportation of goods which
contain duty paid components. These programs include the U.S.
duty drawback,28 6 and Mexico's Pitex, Altex, and maquiladora
programs.2 7 The rationale behind the duty drawback program or
similar devices is to encourage exports by making import inputs
immune with respect to duties in order to increase manufacturers'
cost competitiveness in the foreign market.88
NAFTA does not immediately eliminate the Parties' individual
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id. annex 302.2 § 3.
283 Id. annex 703.2 § 4.
284 Id. art. 708.
285 Id.
286 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A.§ 1313 (a).
287 U.S.I.T.C., Selected Industries, supra note 252, at 128. The programs of Altex
and Pitex provide different benefits to exports based on the percentage of their total sales
exported. Id.
288 RUTH F. STURM, CUSTOM LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 148 (1980).
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duty drawback and similar programs. Rather, it suspends the
termination of these programs by January 1, 2001.289 Once the
existing programs are eliminated, NAFTA will implement a
uniform principle to eliminate the double payment of duties to two
parties on goods which are not the NAFTA-originated goods.2 9°
The amount of duty refund paid under NAFTA should not exceed
the lesser of: (1) the total amount of customs duties paid or owed
on the non-NAFTA input for goods subsequently exported to a
NAFTA country; or (2) the total amount of customs duties paid to
that NAFTA party on the good when it is exported to that party.
291
The elimination of the duty drawback program is one of
NAFTA's mechanisms for avoiding free-riders of the preferential
tariff treatment. It has the purpose of eliminating the incentive for
producers to source from non-NAFTA inputs rather than NAFTA
inputs. Since NAFTA-originated goods can be shipped duty-free
between the NAFTA countries, the double taxation problem is
eliminated. Therefore, there is no need for duty drawback.292
C. Restrictive Rules of Origin
Rules of origin have assumed critical importance not only in
the battle over preferences, but also in the fight for market entry.
NAFTA's origin rule requires a higher regional content in order to
effectively encourage the use of NAFTA inputs. 3 To gain a
competitive advantage under NAFTA, business people would be
likely to source originating NAFTA materials. The higher
regional content also increases the difficulty for foreign products
to access the NAFTA market. These origin rules can also increase
the competitiveness of NAFTA's products and help economic
growth within the free-trade area. Therefore, rules of origin can
serve as an important mechanism to safeguard NAFTA economy's
prosperity. As a result, business people need to understand how
289 The effective date for U.S.-Mexico and Canada-Mexico trade is January 1, 2001.
NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 303.7(A)(a)-(c).
290 Id. art. 303.1
291 Id.
292 Irwin P. Altschuler & Claudia G. Pasche, The North American Free Trade
Agreement: The Ongoing Liberalization of Trade with Mexico, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
Rev. 7, 22 (1993).
293 See infra notes 307-29 and accompanying text.
1996]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the nationality of their products will be defined under NAFTA to
ensure that the products produced in Mexico will be shielded by
the protectionism under NAFTA.
1. The Policies Behind the Rules of Origin
NAFTA designs the elaborate origin rules to disguise its
protection of selected sectors of the economy and its promotion of
the relocation of the manufacturing process to within the NAFTA
area. These origin rules have their critical importance to NAFTA
partners because the NAFTA parties intend to ensure that
businesses can increase their sourcing from the NAFTA region
while accessing this free-trade market. 94 Its purpose is also to
prevent Mexico, with its low labor costs, from becoming an
"export platform" for goods entering the U.S. and Canada, that are
comprised of a majority of non-NAFTA materials."5 The NAFTA
parties who want to ensure the reduced tariffs available under
NAFTA will only benefit from those products which were
produced through significant manufacturing or other economic
activities in the NAFTA market. 96 Therefore, rules of origin
become the mechanism to prevent the possibility of non-NAFTA
imports from being shipped between the NAFTA partners to
escape a higher tariff and exploit a lower tariff. It also prevents
foreign companies from benefiting from the minor processing or
trans-shipment of non-NAFTA goods.297
2. General Mechanisms of the Origin Rules
A good can qualify as having a North American origin and
enjoy the preferential treatment under NAFTA if the good meets
certain tests. First, the good will be considered to originate in the
territory of a NAFTA party if the good is "wholly obtained or
294 Joseph A. LaNasa III, Rules of Origin under the North American Free Trade
Agreement: A Substantial Transformation into Objectively Transparent Protectionism,
34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381, 383-84 (1993).
295 Donald Harrison & Kenneth G. Weigel, Customs Provisions and Rules of Origin
Under the NAFTA, 27 INT'L LAW 654 (1993).
296 Stephen P. Jacobs, The NAFTA: Exports, Jobs, Wages, and Investment, Bus.
AM., Oct. 18, 1993, at 3-4.
297 Harrison & G. Weigel, supra note 295.
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produced in the territory of one or more of the Parties.""29 To meet
the requirements for this test, the goods may not contain
ingredients or components from third countries. 99 Under this
definition, items such as mineral products, agricultural products,
and fish products would be included.30
Second, goods will be considered to be of North American
origin if they are produced entirely in one or more of the NAFTA
countries "exclusively from originating materials." '' Therefore, a
product can combine components and processes from Mexico,
Canada, and the United States to meet the requirements of this
clause. However, if products underwent a process or contained
any parts from a third country, the products would not meet the
requirements of this provision.
Third, a product can be regarded as North American origin if
the product has undergone a change in tariff classification."2 This
change in the tariff classification requirement is derived from the
CFTA test.30 3 It allows a good containing nonoriginating materials
to qualify as a North American good if each non-originating
material used in the production of the good undergoes a change in
tariff classification and such production occurs entirely within the
NAFTA area.3'04 NAFTA defines changes of tariff classification by
reference to changes in the HTS.3 °5 It also embodies a 168-page
appendix in Annex 401 to provide specific rules for individual
HTS chapters.30 6
Fourth, some specific origin rules in Annex 401 require a
regional value calculation in certain products in order to qualify
for NAFTA preferential treatment.3 7 This condition includes
cases where NAFTA requires that certain products satisfy the
298 NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 401(a).
299 Id. art. 415
30 Id.
301 Id. art. 401(c).
302 Id. art. 401(b).
303 Harrison & Weigel, supra note 295, at 654.
304 NAFTA supra note I, art. 401(b).
305 LaNasa, supra note 294, at 388.
306 NAFTA supra note 1, art. 401(b).
307 Id. art. 401(d).
1996]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
specified percentage of regional value-content calculation in
addition to the tariff classification test. These products include
certain types of chemical, plastic, footwear, machinery, electronic,
and automotive products.3 8 In addition, some products can never
meet the change in tariff classification test even though they
contain only a small portion of non-originating materials.3 9 This
situation occurs because the HTS classifies certain products in the
same category as their unassembled parts.1 Therefore, assembly
of such products still remains in the same tariff classification. The
regional value content test, however, provides the mechanism for
dealing with such circumstances.'
Basically, NAFTA calculates the regional value content (RVC)
of a good on the basis of either the transaction-value method or the
net-cost method,"2 Under the transaction value method, regional
value content is defined as a percentage equal to the transaction
value of the goods (TV), minus the value of non-originating
materials ,used by the producer in the production of the good
(VNM) 3 This figure is then divided by the transaction value,
multiplied by 100.314 This can be expressed in a mathematical
formula:
RVC = TV -VNM/TV. X 100
Under the net cost method, the regional value content is
calculated as a percentage equal to the net cost of the good (NC),
minus the value of non-originating materials used by the producer
in the production of the good (VNM).315 This figure is then
308 Id.
309 LaNasa, supra note 294, at 388.
310 Id. The classical example of such products is the bicycle. HTS classifies the
parts of bicycle that include tires, handlebar, chain, and seat in the same category
number as the bicycle. Under the change in tariff classification test, there would be no
chance for the bicycle to comply with the test if it were only assembled in North
America. See id. at 389.
311 Id. at388.
312 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 402 (1).
313 Id. art. 402 (2).
314 Id.
311 Id. art. 401(3).
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divided by the net cost, multiplied by 100.316 This translation can
yield the formula:
RVC = NC - VNM/NC X 100
NAFTA also defines these specific categories of excluded
costs in Article 415. For example, it defines the "transaction
value" as "the price actually paid or payable for a good or
material," with the requirement that this price be "adjusted in
accordance with the principles of paragraphs 1, 3, and 4 of Article
8 of the GATT Customs Valuation Code., 317 It also defines the net
cost as the "total cost" minus the costs of "sales promotion,
marketing and after-sales service costs, royalties, shipping and
packing costs, and non-allowable interest, costs that are included in
the total cost. '3 1 In calculating the net cost, NAFTA -allows the
producer to use several allocation methods as long as the chosen
method is consistent with Uniform Regulations on Article 511.319
Obviously, the two NAFTA regional content methods are
different because the transaction-value cost contains some costs
that are excluded in the net-cost method. The transaction-value
method is based on "the price actually paid or payable for a good
or material" which may include all costs and profits.32 However,
the net-cost does not include such costs as sales promotion,
marketing, and shipping and packing costs, or profits.32' To
balance the difference, NAFTA imposes the transaction-value
method by requiring a higher percentage of regional value content.
Goods would need to contain at least sixty percent originating
content under the transaction value approach. The same goods,
however, would only need to contain at least fifty percent
originating content under the net-cost method.322 In addition,
316 Id.
317 Id. art. 415.
318 Id. art. 415.
319 Id. art. 402(8).
320 Id. at art. 415.
321 Id.
322 Ralph H. Shepphard & Robert J. Leo, NAFTA Rules of Origin-Improvement on
Past Rules?, 6 AuT. INT'L L. PRACTICUM 24 (1993), available in Westlaw , Inlprac File.
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NAFTA requires the exporter or producer of the good to use the
net-cost method to calculate the regional content value in certain
circumstances, such as where the good has no transaction value.323
Nonoriginating materials also need to be calculated in both
methods. Under NAFTA, calculating the value of nonoriginating
material follows the same procedure as in calculating a material's
value.324 That is, the transaction value of a material is determined
in accordance with the Customs Valuation Code.3 25  Therefore,
NAFTA requires that the value of the nonoriginating material
should be the price actually paid or payable for such material.326
The price of such material also includes all the costs of
transportation to the sites of the producer, such as freight costs,
insurance, as well as duties. 27
Generally, the decision about whether material used by a
producer is originating or nonoriginating is made on an all-or-
nothing basis.3 28 That is, if the material qualifies as originating
under the NAFTA origin rules, then no portion of the value will be
treated as nonoriginating, even if such material is comprised of
partial nonoriginating submaterials
3 29
Fifth, under the de minimis rule, goods would be considered
NAFTA originating products if they contain no more than seven
percent of foreign content.33 This rule appears to prevent goods
comprised of foreign content, which is less than seven percent of
the total cost of the goods, from losing their eligibility for the
NAFTA preference. If such goods cannot meet the change in the
tariff classification test or the transaction value of the good is not
acceptable, they are still eligible for the preference. The rule may
also be useful when a party wants to avoid the paperwork of the
regional value content requirement. However, the de minimis rule
does not apply to a number of agriculture goods or to over half of
323 NAFTA, supra note I, art. 402(5).
324 Id. art. 402(9).
325 Id.
326 Id. arts. 402(2), 415.
327 Id. arts. 402(9)(a), 402(9)(c), 415.
328 Harrison & Weigel, supra note 295, at 658.
329 Id.
330 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 405(1)-(2).
[Vol. 22
MEXICAN INVESTMENT
all the listed goods, unless the nonoriginating material is from a
different tariff classification subheading."'
D. The Reduction of Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade
In addition to the elimination of tariff barriers, NAFTA also
reduces or eliminates non-tariff barriers to trade. Such barriers
include quotas, import licensing requirements, import price
requirements, export performance requirements, as well as less
specific barriers, such as customs user fees.332 Since tariff barriers
have fallen dramatically under the effort of General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade,333 non-tariff barriers have received growing
attention.33 4 In many sectors, non-tariff barriers represent more
effective restraints on trade than do actual tariffs.335 Therefore, in
many cases, the elimination of these non-tariff barriers under
NAFTA will result in a significant improvement in market access
among NAFTA countries."'
NAFTA requires that most existing licensing requirements be
removed and prohibits the parties from implementing any new
licensing requirements, except requirements that are specifically
provided for in NAFTA.337 NAFTA also requires that most quota
restrictions be phased out.33 Currently, the U.S. maintains quotas
primarily on textiles, apparel, and some agricultural
commodities.339 The lifting of quotas on intra-regional trade is
likely to contribute to intra-NAFTA trade in these sectors.
Therefore, the imports from Mexico are very likely to increase
substantially.
In addition, NAFTA also provides a new framework for
331 Id. art. 405(3), (6).
332 Id. art. 309(2), art. 310; see also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 130 (1989).
333 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafte GATT].
334 Catherine Curtiss & Kathryn Cameron Atkinson, United States-Latin American
Trade Laws, 21 N.C.J. INT'L LAW& COM. REG. 111 (1995).
335 Altschuler & Pasche, supra note 292, at 23.
336 Id.
331 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 309(1).
338 Id.
339 Altschuler & Pasche, supra note 292, at 23.
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country of origin marking regulations.34  Country of origin
marking regulations can be used as barriers to trade by imposing
requirements that make trade in goods commercially difficult. To
avoid marking rules being abused as a trade barrier, NAFTA
generally allows the party to use any reasonable method to mark
the country of origin of a specific good as long as such marking is
"conspicuous, legible, and sufficiently permanent. 341 The parties
are also obligated to accept marking in English, Spanish, or
French, but may require that the mark accord to the same rules
applicable to their own goods.3 42 Additionally, NAFTA provides
special rules for marking containers.3 43 Under NAFTA, these rules
of marking should prevent NAFTA parties from using marking
requirements to severely, restrict the movement of certain goods
between NAFTA countries.
NAFTA, moreover, liberalized ground transportation barriers
within the NAFTA countries. Cross-border trucking access
throughout North America will be phased in over a period of six
years.3"4 The liberalization of cross-border trucking is likely to
reduce transportation costs substantially for goods produced in
Mexico and transported to the U.S. and Canadian markets, and
therefore, make almost all Mexican products marginally more
price-competitive. .
Lastly, NAFTA also eliminates customs user fees for goods
originating in NAFTA territory.345 Even though the customer user
fees are not significant, they can increase the cost of importation
and weaken their cost competitiveness in comparison to domestic
products. Under NAFTA, both Mexico and the U.S. may not
increase their merchandise processing fee on NAFTA originating
goods. In addition, such fees shall be eliminated by June 30,
340 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 311, annex 311. Marking an import article was first
required by Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 26 Stat. 567, 613 (1981). See David
Silverstein, Country-of-Origin Marking Requirements Under Section 304 of the Tariff
Act: An Importer's Map Through the Maze, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 285 (1987).
341 NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 311.5(a).
342 Id. annex 311.3.
343 Id. annex 311.
314 Id. annex 1212.
345 Id. art. 310.
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1999.346
In general, NAFTA rules of origin have made a significant
improvement in determining a product's origin. The NAFTA
origin rules do away with the subjective and ambiguous
substantial transformation test 347 and use more objective and
specific approaches. This increases their uniformity and
predictability, and thus facilitates businesses in purchasing and
sourcing decision making.
E. Gateway Into the Latin American Market-
Today, Latin America has passed through the "lost decade
' '3 48
and is starting to rejuvenate its economics. With the assistance of
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, most Latin
American countries are undergoing market-oriented economic
,adjustments.349 Moreover, these economic adjustments often lead
to democratic-oriented political reforms in these countries.35° As
the economic and political climate changes, business opportunities
are rapidly emerging. A growing number of new consumers and
industrial markets, abundant natural resources and expanded
capital markets are now within easy reach of foreigners. To many
foreign investors, the opening of Latin America has come as a
surprise. Also, for the first time ever, Western Hemisphere
markets rival and may surpass those in Europe and East Asia.
In recent years, the interest of regional trade liberalization has
346 Id. annex 310.1.
317 The substantial transformation test was articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562
(1908). The substantial transformation test affords the customs officials and courts great
subjectivity and discretion. Id.; see C. Edward Galfand, Comment, Heeding the Callfor
A Predicable Rule of Origin, 11 U, PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 469, 471, 480, 484 (1989). This
test leads to great ambiguity for business in predicting how a given good will be treated.
Id.
348 Most Latin American countries suffered debt crisis in 1980s. Roberto Zahler,
Th6 Background, Rationale and Success of Chilean Economic Policy, 16 LoY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 275 (1994). To solve the debt crisis, Latin American countries
followed the recommendations from International Monetary Fund and World Bank to
implement painful economic adjustments. Id. As a result, the 1980s are regarded as a
"lost decade" for Latin American countries. Id.
349 Id.
350 Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin America:
Towards a Communal Model of Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 221, 223 (1994).
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resurged in Latin America. Therefore, several new regional trade
liberalization and economic cooperations have been established in
this region. For instance, the Southern Cone Common Market,
known as "MERCOSUR," went into force on January 1, 1995.351
This economic bloc comprises, together with Brazil, Argentina,
Uruguay, and Paraguay, a market of 190 million people and $800
billion of annual production.352 MERCOSUR also represents about
half of Latin America's GDP and is the largest economic bloc in
Latin America.353
The trend of trade liberalization and economic cooperation in
Latin America is actually inspired by former U.S. President Bush's
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), which is dedicated to
free trade in the Western Hemisphere.354 The EAI did not trigger
these free-trade developments, but it may have served as an
impetus in the processes of trade liberalization within this
region.355 Facing the growing regionalization in Latin America,
the NAFTA parties do not confine themselves to their NAFTA
partners only. Instead, the NAFTA partners show a strong
ambition in Latin American markets and have aggressively
participated in the resurging regionalization. For example, Mexico
is using the strategy of establishing free trade agreements with
several countries in the region to strengthen its economic presence
in the Latin American markets.356 In particular, President Clinton's
351 Adrian Dickson, Brazil: MERCOSUR Launch to Spark Latin America Trade
Boom, REUTERS-CENT. & S. AM., Jan. 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library Txtcsa
File. For further discussion on integration between Mercosur members see Marta
Haines-Ferrari, MERCOSUR: A New Model of Latin American Economic Integration,
25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 413-15 (1993).
352 Dickson, supra note 351, at 413-15. The agreement went into effect on January
1, 1995 and immediately phased out 90% of the tariff barriers between the partners. Id.
The remaining 10 percent of tariffs in the area of strategic industries such as automotive
and computers will be also eliminated by 2001. Id.
353 NAFTA Is Not Alone, ECONOMIST, June 18, 1994, at 47.
314 Richard Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements in The Western Hemisphere, 8
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'VY 683, 689 (1993).
355 Id. The EAI was proposed by President Bush on June 27, 1990, U.S. Signs
Trade-Investment Pact with The Four MERCOSUR Nations; Southern Cone Common
Market Nations: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, Bus. AM., July 1, 1991,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Asapii File.
356 See Anthony Boadle, Chile: Mexico and Chile Sign Free Trade Accord on
Sunday, REUTERS, Sept, 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne.
Currently, Mexico has completed four free trade agreements with several Latin
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economic policy toward Latin America basically replicates the
EAI,357 and stresses that the passage of NAFTA was only the
beginning of the creation of free trade in the entire hemispheric
market. 58 Following this policy, the movement of integrating the
Pan-American market has accelerated recently. At the Summit of
Americas held in December 1994, the NAFTA parties formally
invited Chile to join NAFTA.359 Along these same lines, the
presidents of the United States and Brazil asked for input on
potential links between NAFTA and MERCOSUR."6 ° In addition,
the 34 leaders in the Western Hemisphere also agreed to create a
free-trade zone in the Americas by the year 2005.2" Accordingly,
the trade ministers of the Americas signed a declaration ratifying
their commitment made at the Summit of Americas, as well as a
plan of action to achieve this ambitious goal.362
The integration process in the Americas will likely provide a
favorable channel for Mexican products to access the contracting
countries' markets. Furthermore, as a Spanish-speaking country,
Mexico shares similar social customs with most other Latin
American countries. Due to this unique characteristic, business
American Countries, including Chile, Venezuela and Columbia, Bolivia, and Costa Rica.
Mexico, Chile FTA, I MEX. TRADE & L. REP. No. 1, Oct. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Mtlr File; Group of Three Agrees Program; Also Colombia & Chile, But
American Deal Stalls, LATIN AMERICA WKLY. REP., Dec. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Lan File; Bolivia-Mexico: Businesses Welcome New Free Trade Pact,
INTER PRESS SERV., Sept. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File;
Mexico: Mexico and Costa Rica Sign Free Trade Accord, REUTERS, Apr. 5, 1994,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtcsa File. In addition, several free trade talks are
underway with so-called "northern triangle," namely El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras. Three Central American Countries, Mexico to Sign Accord, XNHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Jan. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Iacnws File.
357 Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration and The Elimination of Legal
Obstacles Under A NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARv. INT'L. L.J. 127 (1995).
358 See, e.g.. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, Remarks at Commerce
Department Budget Briefing, FED. NEWS SERV., Feb. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS
Library, Fednws File.
359 NAFTA 'Amigos' Invite Chile to Begin Accession Talks, I I Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 49, at 1914 (Dec. 14, 1994).
360 Brazil Goal of Free Trade Area of Americas by 2005 Is Feasible, Brazil's
Cardoso Say, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) Apr. 24, 1995.
361 James Brooke, U.S. and 33 Hemisphere Nations Agree to Create Free-Trade
Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1994, at 1.
362 Jose Antonio Puertas, 34 Countries Push Pan-American Free Trade Zone, But
Brazil Wary on Pace, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Curnws File.
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people can also regard Mexico and the Latin American countries
as a homogeneous market. Thus, Mexico can function as an
important testing market for the entrance of products into the
immense Latin American market. If a product can be marketed
successfully in the Mexican market, it also means that it is
probable that success will follow in the Latin American market.
Therefore, Mexico can truly be a stepping-stone to the Latin
American market.
V. Market Access in Potential Sectors
Since liberalization of sensitive industries in the NAFTA
countries will take five to fifteen years, enterprises in Asian
countries still have time to plan and reallocate resources in order to
minimize the impact of NAFTA.363 Therefore, Asian enterprises
have to identify product sectors that will be in greater demand in
the North American market due to NAFTA trade creation. Asian
enterprises should especially focus on products which, could be
used as inputs into Mexican-assembled final products shipped for
the U.S. market. This is because some Asian components will be
price-competitive and their use will not disqualify Mexican-made
finished products from NAFTA preferential treatment. However,
this approach will require paying close attention to the restrictive
rules of origin under NAFTA. Potential sectors for Asian
enterprise to access the Mexico market to alleviate the impact of
NAFTA market as well as the feasible market access strategies
will be fully discussed below.
A. Automotive Goods
Consistent with the enormous importance of automotive
manufacturing and the trade in and among NAFTA parties,
NAFTA also addresses the liberalization of trade and investment
in the automotive sector.3 4 In general, the agreement eliminates
duties, as well as the various special restrictions that apply to trade
in motor vehicles and in automotive parts..3 65 The agreement also
363 See supra 274-85 notes and accompanying text.
364 See NAFTA supra note 1, ch. 3, annex 300-A.
365 HUFBAUER & ScorT, supra note 252, at 38.
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36prohibits the parties from imposing any new restrictions.
However, NAFTA still uses a higher regional content requirement
to ensure the comparative advantage of the intra-regional
automotive industry.367
NAFTA has scheduled a reduction of, and eventually the
elimination of the duties on passenger cars, light trucks, minivans,
and autoparts. 368  Particularly, the reduction of the twenty-five
percent duty, which the U.S. currently levies on light trucks and
some minivans, could lead to a greater production of these
vehicles in Mexico.369 More importantly, the removal of non-tariff
barriers in this sector is likely to have its greatest impact on
bilateral trade in automotive products. For instance, NAFTA
requires Mexico to modify its "Decree for Development and
Modernization of the Automotive Industry of 1989" to make it
consistent with NAFTA before January 1., 2004.370 This is likely to
liberalize the Mexican automotive industry sector and facilitate
foreign participation in this sector.
Aside from the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, the
most significant feature of NAFTA respective to automotive trade
is that NAFTA contains a more stringent, but clear and
predictable, origin ruling.37' To qualify for NAFTA benefits, the
regional value content for passenger vehicles and light trucks must
be greater than 62.5 percent.372 In addition, the regional content
should be greater than 60 percent for passenger vehicle and light
truck engines and transmissions, and all other vehicles and auto
parts.373 These higher requirements will be phased in through
366 NAFTA supra note 1, art. 309(1).
367 See supra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.
368 NAFTA supra note 1, annex 302.2. For instance, the NAFTA will immediately
eliminate U.S. tariffs on Mexico made automobiles. Hufbauer & Scott, supra note 252
at 38.
369 NAFTA supra note 1, annex 302.2.
370 Id. annex 300A.2.
371 Kathryn L. McCall, What is Asia Afraid of? The Diversionary Effect of
NAFTA's Rules of Origin on Trade Between the United States and Asia, 25 CAL W.
INT'L L. J. 400-01 (1995).
372 NAFTA supra note 1, art. 403(5).
373 Id.
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increases in the regional value content in 1998 and 2002.374
However, NAFTA gives new plants a five-year grace period from
their start-up during which they may have only 50 percent NAFTA
content.375
In addition, calculation of the regional value content based on
the net-cost method will be strengthened somewhat by requiring
the "tracing" of non-NAFTA components. 376  Automotive
manufacturers need to report the value of certain non-originating
materials used in components as calculated at the time the first
person in a NAFTA country takes the title.3 77  This traces the
autoparts' origin through the production process and thereby,
improves the accuracy of the content valuation.
The fairly rigid rules of origin for automotive products are
designed to reduce the use of automobile components assembled
among NAFTA partners but imported from non-NAFTA countries
because the higher the regional value content requirement, the
more value that will be generated in the NAFTA region. As a
result, the automotive rules of origin will force non-NAFTA
automotive companies which have already manufactured cars in
North America, such as Japanese companies, to source more parts
in the North American facilities. This trend may adversely affect
Asian automobile parts manufacturers.
Facing the new trade rules under NAFTA, Asian automotive
parts producers are advised to invest in Mexico because Mexico
provides production quality and cost advantages that other existing
sites in North America do not. In addition, the Mexican market
represents major growth potential because the new trade rules
under NAFTA will provoke abundant business opportunities in
Mexico. Moreover, many Asian automotive corporations have
already operated in Mexico. 7 1 These Asian operations,
374 The regional value content must be 56 percent and 55 percent respectively by
January 1, 1998 and 60 percent by January 1, 2002. Id. art. 403(5).
371 Id. art. 403(6).
376 See discussion of net-cost method, supra notes 315-23.
377 NAFTA supra note 1, art. 403.1.
378 In addition to Nissan, which is wholly operated by itself, many Asian
automobile producers affiliate with the U.S. Big Three to set up operation in Mexico.
See GRAY NEWMAN & ANNA SZTERENFELD, BusINEss INTERNATIONAL'S GUIDE TO DOING
BUSINESS IN MEXICO, 168, 171 (1993). For example, the Korean Daewoo Motors, and
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particularly the Japanese-owned automotive corporations, are
likely to source from Asian parts suppliers because they place
substantial emphasis on maintaining long term relationships with a
limited number of automotive parts suppliers.379 This situation
poses another competitive advantage for Asian automotive parts
producers in Mexico. Therefore, these parts supplier need to
closely coordinate with their major customers in order to
successfully establish their production bases in Mexico.
B. Textiles and Apparel Goods
Textile and apparel industries are strongly protected in North
America, particularly in the United States. Imports of this sector
were subject to both quotas and relatively high tariffs under the
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA).3 ° For instance, the U.S. imposes
a twenty percent tariff on textiles, a figure much higher than the
four percent tariff on all imported goods."' Although from
January 1, 1995, the quota system under MFA will be phased out
over 10 years under the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing,3"2 this WTO Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing also imposes new safeguard mechanisms
and restrictive disciplines on transshipment and monitoring.383 In
addition, import duty on textiles remains subject to individual
WTO member's tariff schedules.384 As a result, the Textiles
Agreement is not likely to ease the import restraints of foreign
Kia Motors have made the Pontiac LeMans for GM and Festiva for Ford. Id. at 171. In
addition, Isuzu cooperates with GM to build the Geo brand, Mazda with Ford to build
the Tracer, and Mitsubishi and Chrysler produce pickups under both names in Mexico.
Id.
319 U.S.I.T.C., RULES OF ORIGIN ISSUES RELATED To NAFTA AND THE NORTH
AMERICAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY, Investigation No. 332-314, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 2460.13-
14. (Nov. 1991).
380 Agreement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T.
1001.
381 Janet Patrica Farmer, NAFTA and The Textile and Apparel Industries: Made in
North America, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 299 (1994).
382 Article 9 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, annex IA, Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No.
316, 103d Cong., 2d. Sess. 1396 (1994) [hereinafter Textiles Agreement.]
383 Id.
384 David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade
Law in the U.S., 12 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 101 (1995).
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textiles and apparels in the North American market.385
Under NAFTA, the parties will phase out their duties on
originating textile and apparel within a maximum of ten years.386
In response, the U.S. immediately terminated the import quotas on
qualifying textiles from Mexico when NAFTA took effect.387
Thereafter, no quotas have applied to textile and apparel goods
originating in NAFTA territory.
To enjoy the full benefits of NAFTA, textiles and apparel
companies need to, comply with the restrictive rules of origin
requirement. NAFTA excludes the origin rules of textiles and
apparel from the regional value content requirements.388 Instead,
textiles and apparel are subjected to a more restrictive regime. The
textile origin rules, known as yam-forward rule, require that the
yam used in the manufacture of the good be produced within the
treaty region.389  The yam-forward rule is a triple transformation
test because it requires that the yam be produced, the fabric made,
and the clothing sewn in the NAFTA area.39° NAFTA also allows
some exceptions to the yam-forward rule. Certain materials, such
as wool, which are in short supply or not produced in North
America, can also receive preferential treatment under NAFTA
without complying with the yam-forward rule, as long as the good
made from that fabric is cut and sewn in the NAFTA countries.3 91
As in the situation involving automotive products, the rationale
385 Many Asian textiles suppliers have worried that the Textiles Agreement will
further restrain their exports to the North American market. Frances Williams, Fruits of
Textiles Pact Fail to Ripen--Poor Nations Have Yet to See Benefits from Accord, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library Allwld File; Such worries
have been emphasized by 24 U.S. quota calls in 1995. Id. According to these quota
calls, the U.S. government imposed new restrictions on 14 developing countries in Asia
and Latin America under the safeguard clause of the Textile Agreement. Id. In
addition, the Hong Kong government predicted that a reduction of its textile and apparel
exports is likely to reach $41 billion HK due to the new Textile Agreement. See Amy
Chew, China: Full Implementation Set to Increase Exports by'26.5 PC, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtfe File.
386 NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 3 (scheduled to annex 302.2); annex 300-B, app. 2.1,
and app. 3.1 (B); see also U.S.I.T.C., Selected Industries, supra note 252, at 225.
387 NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 3.
388 Id. art. 401(d).
389 U.S.I.T.C., Selected Industries, supra note 252, at 253.
390 NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 4, annex 401, XI.
391 Id. ch. 4, annex 401.
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of using the yam-forward rule is to eliminate quotas and tariffs as
an incentive to encourage the producers to buy North American
fabrics.392 However, this NAFTA protection mechanism in textile
.and apparel sectors is likely to impede the competitiveness of
Asian products in the NAFTA market and therefore have a strong
impact onAsian exporters.393 In addition, labor costs are critical in
product competitiveness because this sector is labor intensive.394
Major Asian exporters are confronting several disadvantages, such
as restrictive quotas in the U.S., restrictive export growth under the
Textile Agreement, and rising production costs in their home
countries.9 5 Facing these adverse factors, Asian producers may,
therefore, consider establishing their North American production
base in Mexico to take advantage of abundant and cheap Mexican
labor, and the elimination of quotas and tariffs under NAFTA.
C. Computers and Compuier Peripherals
NAFTA is not likely to increase U.S. imports of Mexican
computers and computer peripherals in the short run. However,
because the assembly of computer and computer peripheral is
labor intensive,396 NAFTA, in the long term, may impact Asian
countries, such as China and Thailand, which specialize in low-
end computer product assemblies or subassemblies.3 97 This is
because NAFTA will divert trade and investment to Mexico from
these Asian countries. In addition, rules of origin under NAFTA,
392 See LaNasa, supra note 294, at398.
-393 The market shares of Far Eastern textile and apparel imports in the U.S. dropped
to 55.7 percent in 1994, down from 58.7 percent of 1993 levels. See 1994 Overall
Deficit Up 43 Percent; Merchandise Trade Gap Hit $166 Billion, 12 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) No. 8, at 332 (Feb. 22, 1995). On the other hand, in 1994, Mexican textile and
apparel products grew 31 percent over 1993 levels. See Mexican Apparel and Textile
Exports to U.S. See Jump under NAFTA, ITC Says, 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 19,
at 815 (May 10, 1995). Currently, Mexico is tailing China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
South Korea and ranked the fifth largest supplier in the U.S.. Id.
194 Labor comprises more than 31% of total apparel production costs, and more
than 21% in textile production. Farmer, supra note 381, at 297.
395 Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea are the big three Asian suppliers in the
U.S. Mexican Apparel, supra note 393. Currently, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South
Korea are experiencing rising production costs, and China is facing restrictive quotas.
U.S.I.T.C., Selected Industries, supra note 252, at 262.
396 U.S.I.T.C., Indus. & Trade Summ., Computers, Peripherals, And Computer
Components, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 2821.4 (Oct. 1994) [hereinafter U.S.I.T.C., Computers].
397 See U.S.I.T.C., Selected Industries, supra note 252, at 203.
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are relatively lenient towards computer products.39 This lenient
requirement enables personal computers to be assembled in the
NAFTA region using all nonoriginating components and still
enjoy NAFTA's preferential treatment, as long as the motherboard
is made in North America. Mexico's competitive labor cost
combined with NAFTA's relatively liberal rules of origin and
phase out of tariffs will result in Mexican computer products
posing a strong threat to Asian computer products in the long term.
Furthermore, as Mexico strives to modernize itself, the
Mexican market for computers and peripherals holds potential for
Asian computer companies, because a growing number of
Mexican companies need computers to carry on their daily
operations. The market is also receptive to new computer
equipment. Computer literacy is growing in Mexico and,
therefore, the Mexican market has been regarded as one of the
fastest-growing computer markets with an expected annual growth
of 24 percent in the next two years.399
Since Mexico's computer market is rapidly growing, Asian
computer enterprises need to enter this market as soon as possible
in order to take advantage of increasing business opportunities.
Admittedly, directly marketing their products into the market
through their own efforts could involve much time, costs, and
risks. In particular, many Asian computer enterprises are small
and medium size companies and only have limited capital and
marketing resources. Therefore, directly marketing products by
themselves is not likely an appropriate approach for Asian
enterprises to penetrate Mexico's computer market.
Nevertheless, Asian computer makers, particularly Taiwanese-
400
owned producers, are known for their cost competitiveness.Their management approach is focused on a lean, flexible design-
398 NAFTA rules of origin only requires the motherboard, which is defined as
circuit board with a central processing unit or microprocessor, is North American in
origin.
399 Sali Tripathi, High-Tech Rebound, ASIA INC., Feb. 1995, available in LEXIS,
World Lib. Allwld File. In addition, another report also predicts that the Mexican
computer market will have continuing growth in next five years. Mexico-Computers
and Peripherals, MARKET REP., Mar. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Mktrpt File; see also U.S.I.T.C., Computers, supra note 396, at 46.
400 Mark Clifford, Power Switch, FARE. EcON. REv., Dec. 16, 1993, at 44-45.
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and-manufacturing style, which enables them to change and
complete the designs rapidly as well as to slash costs to the bone.40 '
Thus, many Asian-made computer components, such as
motherboards, image scanners, monitors, key boards, and mice,
have significant market shares in the global market.402  To
successfully penetrate the speedily-growing Mexican computer
market and gain strong footholds in it, Asian computer companies
must utilize their design and manufacturing strengths. A
successful strategy used by Acer, the largest Taiwan computer
maker, can be replicated by Asian computer makers. Acer
strategically allied0 3 itself with a Mexican firm, Compute, which
has a strong marketing and distribution channels in the Mexican
404
market. As mentioned above, the assembly of computer and
computer peripheral is labor intensive, therefore, Acer first set up a
maquiladora type of assembly operation in Mexico to benefit from
the low cost Mexican labor 5 Then, Acer utilized its modular
design, packaging, and assembly technique, a method to ensure the
swift delivery of high quality and advanced PCs, while
maintaining low inventory levels.406 This strategic alliance has
allowed Acer to supply "fresh" PCs directly and in a timely
manner to the Mexican market.4 7 On the other hand, Compute
provides its marketing and distribution strengths, clear knowledge
401 Id.
402 For instance, the global market shares of Taiwan-made notebook PCs was 22%,
image scanners 55 percent, monitors 51 percent, motherboards 83 percent, switching
power supply 30 percent, keyboard 49 percent, and mice 80 percent in 1993. Taiwan's
Computer Industry; Inside the Box, ECONOMIST, July 9, 1994, at 65.
43 Strategic alliance is a type of business cooperation that allows different
corporations to work together in order to achieve their strategic purpose. See Industrial
Development & Investment Commission, Ju Ho Chia Ciang Chung Hsiao Ch'i Yeh
Chin Hsing Ts' Lieh Lien Meng, (How to Enhancively Assist Small and Medium Size
Enterprises to Approach Strategic Alliance) INDUS. INVESTMENT BRIEF, Feb. 1994, at 10-
11. The alliance is not limited to a traditional type of joint venture for the cooperation,
but can also be based on a non-equity oriented cooperation, such as a long term supply
contract, or technology cooperation. Id. In addition, the alliance does not focus on full-
scale cooperation, but rather focuses on an integration of different value-added activities
in a specific market. Id.
404 Acer Forms Fifth Regional Business Unit; Joint Venture with Long-Term
Mexico Partner to Boost Latin American Presence, Bus. WiRE, June 14, 1994.
405 Id.
406 Id.
407 Id.
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of local requirements, broad financial resources, and outstanding
management team to market and distribute Acer's computer and
peripheral products.! 8 As a result, within three years the strategic
alliance has enjoyed great achievements and now commands the
largest market share, 29 percent, in the Mexican market. °9
D. Telecommunication Equipment
In addition to the computer market, Asian enterprises can also
initiate strategic alliances in Mexico's telecommunication market,
since the telecommunication market shares a character similar to
that of Mexico's computer market. Business opportunities in the
Mexican telecommunication sector are also expected to experience
significant growth. ° Much of this growth has been spurred by the
privatization of Mexican telecommunications system initiated in
1990.41 Through successful privatization of its state-owned
telephone company, TELMEX, in 1991,412 the telecommunication
sector in Mexico has received large inflows of resources to finance
Mexico's modernization and expansion of its telecommunication
network.4 3 As the expansion of the telecommunication network
continues, the demand for telecommunication equipment is likely
to increase. In addition, the implementation of NAFTA will also
lead to a growth of demand in telecommunication equipment and
services. As many investors move into the Mexican market, the
demand for all kinds of telecommunication equipment and
services, such as telephone apparatus, and facsimile machines, will
increase significantly. Currently, Mexico has no more than 8 lines
per 100 inhabitants.4 14  Since the supply of telecommunication
408 Id.
409 Computer Market Trend, 5 MEX. TRADE & L. REP. No. 5, June 1, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Ailwld File.
410 See infra notes 411-14, and acompanying text.
411 The new ownership of TELMEX is represented by a consortium formed by
France Telecom, Southwestern Bell, and a group of Mexican investors, and minority
participation of the Mexican government. Gabrie Azekely and Oscar Vera, What
Mexico Brings to the Table: Negotiating Free Trade with the U.S., COLUM. J. WORLD
Bus., June 22, 1991. Under the privatization terms, TELMEX obtained a five year
concession to supply telephone service as a regulated monopoly. Id.
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 U.S.I.T.C., Indus. & Trade Summary, Telecommunications Equipment,
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services is insufficient and there is a strong demand for such
services, this deficiency. indicates plenty of growth potential for all
segments of the telecommunication market.1  These
developments also represent continued and expanding
opportunities for Asian enterprises.
Like the Asian computer industry, many Asian
telecommunication equipment producers have been famous for
producing cost-competitive technology in the middle-level range
of telecommunication equipment. Production of switchboards,
telephone apparatuses and facsimile machines have enabled them
to become some of the major suppliers among world-renowned
telecommunication companies. Therefore, Asian enterprises
should utilize this strength and function as suppliers of
telecommunication equipment in the Mexican market. They can
ship semi-finished products and components to their Mexican
maquiladora plants for final assembly. By taking advantage of
Mexican low-cost labor and the manufacturing experience of
Asian enterprises, they can also produce cost-competitive and high
quality products in Mexico, and market them to the Mexican
market.
However, to quickly and effectively secure important roles in
,the growing Mexican telecommunication market, Asian
enterprises need to build a strategic alliance with main players in
the market. Under the privatization terms, TELMEX obtained a
five-year concession to supply telephone service as a regulated
monopoly.4 1  This also means that by 1997 TELMEX will be the
major consumer of telecommunication equipment. Therefore, to
U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 2820. 46 (1994).
415 Although the economic setback in 1995 is likely to decrease the growth of the
Mexican telecommunication market by 21 percent, the growth is expected to resume at
an average rate of 5 percent in 1996 and 1997. See Telecommunication, MEx. TRADE &
L. REP., May 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Mtlr File.
416 For example, in 1994, Taiwan's telecommunication industry has the fourth
largest production worth in the world, and it has become the major source for
telecommunication products since 1991. See Taiwan: Taiwan is Now A Major Source
for Telecommunications Products, Bus. TAIWAN, Sept. 23, 1991, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Txtfe File; Taiwan: Press Digest; Taiwan Newspapers-Nov 7, REUTERS,
Nov. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtfe File.
"I Howard LaFranchi, Competition Lines Up for Long Distance Operating in
Mexico, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File.
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strengthen their roles in the Mexican market, Asian enterprises
should seek to strategically ally themselves with TELMEX in
order to have access to the Mexican market as important suppliers.
Similarly, in the long-term, they should seek the same approach
with their existing North American customers or other large
telecommunications service providers, such as the Bell regional
operating companies in the U.S., which are expected to expand
their local service networks as well as enter the equipment market
this decade.418
E. Machine Tools
Traditionally, the U.S. market is an important export
destination for Asian machine tools. 419 However, the major Asian
machine tool makers, Japan and Taiwan, were subject to a
voluntary restraint agreement (VRA) imposed by the U.S.
government which limited their development in the U.S. market.2 °
Although the VRA was terminated in the end of 1993, it has not
been easy for Asian machine tool manufacturers to regain their
position in the U.S. market because the U.S. machine tools
industry has improved their international competitiveness in the
past seven years.421 In addition, the appreciation of the Yen and
the new Taiwan dollar, and the shortage of labor, have deteriorated
the price-competitive position of Taiwanese and Japanese machine
418 DRI/ MCGRAW-HILL, supra note 4, at 10.
419 For example, the U.S. market currently is Taiwan's second largest export
destination absorbing the island's 21 percent of total machine tools exports. See
Taiwan: Machine Tool Imports and Exports See Sold Growth, Bus. TAIWAN, Oct. 16,
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtfe File. However, with the lift of
voluntary restraint agreement with the U.S., the U.S. is expected to take over Hong
Kong as the largest export outlet for Taiwanese machine tools. Id.
420 In 1986, the U.S. Reagan administration negotiated with the Taiwan and
Japanese governments on exports of machine tools to the U.S.. See Ben Shen, Taiwan:
Machine Tool Manufacturing-An End to 'Voluntary Restraint', Bus. TAiwAN, Jan. 24,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtfe File; Japan: MITI to Terminate
Machine Tool VRA in December, COMLINE, Sept. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Txtfe File. As a result, the three governments agreed to five years of voluntary
restraint agreements (VRA). Id. Nevertheless, the Bush administration reached an
agreement with the Taiwanese government to extend to extend VRA for an extra two
years. Id. Eventually, these VRAs have cultivated U.S. machine tools companies'
international competitiveness and therefore have impeded these two countries' machine
tools development in the U.S. market for seven years. Id.
421 Id.
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tools and deterred the price-sensitive U.S. consumers.4 2
Shortage of labor, costly domestic currency, and the possibility
of re-imposing the VRA by the U.S. are the main threats to the
development of Asian machine tool manufacturers. To alleviate
these threats, Asian manufacturers should consider relocating their
production to the NAFTA countries in order to regain their
competitive position in the U.S. market. Mexico is a feasible
investment destination for Asian machine tools makers because
Mexico has abundant labor, a devaluated Mexican peso, and is free
of export restraint to the U.S. market shielded by NAFTA.
Furthermore, Mexico also represents a promising market for
Asian machine tool producers. Mexico's modernization in its
economy and the establishment of NAFTA have increased new
investments in various industries, such as automotive, autoparts
and steel products, to expand their manufacture facilities and
capacities.423 This expansion of the Mexican manufacturing
industry has stimulated a strong demand for machine tools, and
such demand is expected to have an average 25 percent growth for
the next three years. 424 To successfully use Mexico as a production
base bound for the U.S. market, Asian machine tool makers need
to carefully manage rules of origin under NAFTA, and utilize
cheap Mexican labor imputs into their Mexican operations.
The above-mentioned analysis and suggestions intend to
provide Asian enterprises with an alternative way of thinking
when they formulate their Mexican operation strategies and use it
as their North American production bases. It is understandable
that many Asian enterprises are not the vanguards in the Mexican
market to take the major shares of business benefits in this
growing country. However, many opportunities still exist for
Asian enterprises to secure a strong presence in the Mexican
market, if they have the courage and wisdom to explore the market
niches and successfully utilize their strengths in such niches.
422 See Ben Shen, Taiwan: Taipei Int'l Machine Tool Show-Increased Demand
from European Buyers, Bus. TAIWAN, Apr. 10, 1995.
423 Mexico-Machine Tools Incl. Presses for Working Metals, MKT. REP., Mar. 21,
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Market File.
424 Id.
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VI. Conclusion
Undoubtedly, integration in the North American countries will
have an impact on Asian countries. This integration also
represents a significant challenge to their industries. Since the
North American market represents a very important export
destination of Asian products, enterprises from Asian countries
must seriously consider establishing their production bases in
Mexico in order to maintain their competitive positions in the
NAFTA market.
There is also little doubt that Mexico's structural reforms have
significantly contributed to the growth of the Mexican economy.
Although some pitfalls such as labor practices and infrastructure
exist in Mexico, the Mexican government's efforts in its
macroeconomic adjustments and political reform will help Mexico
improve its investment climate' in the near future. In addition,
Mexico's peso crisis has inevitably resulted in its economic
stagnation in the near term, and unavoidably damaged investors'
confidence in Mexico's investment climate. However, the sharp
devaluation in the Mexican peso is not necessarily a negative to all
investors. The peso crisis will certainly have a strong impact on
investors involved in portfolio investment of Mexican government
bonds. It also provides a positive influence for those investors
involved in direct investments in Mexico. Because of the
devaluated Mexican peso, investors can significantly reduce the
production costs in Mexican operations, and therefore render their
Mexican products more competitive in the global market.
The improvement in Mexico's foreign investment legal
framework has facilitated foreign investors' bringing their capital
and technologies to participate in Mexico's economic
revitalization. However, the success in attracting the foreign
investments and technologies may depend on enforcement of
intellectual properties protection in Mexico. The Mexican
government still needs to put great effort into enforcement issues
in order to convince foreign investors that their technologies will
truly be protected in Mexico. In addition, as tariff incentives in
the maquiladora industry will be eliminated by NAFTA, the
Mexican government needs to restructure the maquiladora industry
form assembly-for-export industry to a full-scale manufacturing
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one, in order to ensure its continuation in providing economic
benefits to both Mexico and foreign investors.
Because Mexico will benefit most from the North American
integration, enterprises from Asia must make full use of Mexico's
comparative advantages under NAFTA in order to sharpen their
competitive position in the NAFTA market. However, they must
pay attention to rules of origin, and carefully manage products
which could serve as inputs into Mexican made final products
bound for the North American market. Industries like automotive
goods, textiles and apparels, computers, telecommunication
equipment, and machine tools are suitable for Asian enterprises to
build their North American production bases in Mexico.
Nevertheless, they should fully utilize their strengths to build
strategic alliances with other multinational corporations or local
Mexican firms, and incorporate the strengths of the allied parties
in order to quickly gain a strong position in the Mexican market.
At the 1994 Summit of Americas, the NAFTA partners invited
Chile to join NAFTA, and also agreed to create a free-trade zone
in the Americas by 2005. As the integration process continuously
expands from'North American countries to all the Western
Hemisphere countries, Mexico cannot only be run by investors as
a North American production base. Rather, investors should have
a long-term view on running Mexico as a regional hub in the
immense American market. It is true that Asian enterprises need
to quickly establish bases in Mexico so that they not only can
strengthen their competitiveness in the NAFTA market, but can
also enjoy the major business benefits in the emerging Western
Hemisphere Free Trade market.
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